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1. Introduction 
Why does the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) still exist today? 
Almost 60 years after it was established by the General Assembly as a temporary agency, 
it remains active today, and one might argue that it is more established in the Near East 
than ever. In its day-to-day work there is not much evidence of temporary characteristics 
of the agency. Indeed, from being responsible for basic relief and humanitarian services 
only it has developed into a provider of quasi-public services including education and 
health care.  
During an internship with UNRWA in its Geneva office in 2007, I was placed in the role 
of representing UNRWA to interns and employees of other UN agencies. For the first 
time I was confronted with criticism of the agency, and I was unable to craft a response to 
those who questioned the legitimacy of UNRWA. Why is it necessary to single out one 
particular refugee problem when there is the Office of the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), which has a mandate to care for every refugee in the world except 
the ones receiving services from UNRWA? Critics – less within the UN but more so in the 
press - go as far as to describe UNRWA as a “cancerous” organisation that spreads in the 
region to make refugees ever more dependent on foreign aid and to perpetuate the refugee 
problem into eternity. Although my initial reaction was to see this criticism as 
exaggerated I still could not find the right arguments in favour of UNRWA’s prolonged 
existence.  
For my thesis I developed a set of questions that are more feasible, but are motivated by 
the basic question, “why does UNRWA still exist today”? In order to respond to this 
question I first had to explain the reasons for its establishment, as well as to identify the 
most prominent developments concerning its mandate and its operations in the last 6 
decades until today. While this is a rather descriptive process, my research was always 
guided by the more interesting questions of “why did the agency change?”, “who initiated 
the changes?”, and “whose interests does UNRWA serve?” 
First, the sole fact that UNRWA still exists today indicates that the stakeholders 
concerned welcome the agency’s existence. Despite criticism the agency has never 
actually been threatened with dissolution. The countries and organisations concerned 
must have an interest in keeping UNRWA and its services to the Palestine refugee 
population – and even in expanding UNRWA’s response to changes on the ground. 
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Making these interests visible is also an aim of my thesis, which furthers the goal of 
understanding the agency’s development.  
The next step is to ask in how far UNRWA is an active player in these developments. Is 
it, as a subsidiary organ of the UN, just responsible for the execution of decisions that 
were taken elsewhere, or is it an active creator and designer of its work? 
I chose two elements of UNRWA’s work in order to find answers to the above-mentioned 
questions: development and protection. The evolution of these concepts will be explained, 
changes will be made visible and again questions will be asked on the motives of these 
changes.  
The two aspects development and protection offer ground for research because they have 
clearly developed in history and are still developing. The concept and the implementation 
of development have changed considerably – a change that can be documented and 
shown. The agency’s engagement in protection issues has changed as well and 
discussions within the agency on its protection role are still ongoing.  
UNRWA calls itself a human development agency rather than only a development agency. 
Nonetheless, this thesis argues that most if not all of UNRWA’s work can be described as 
being development work, since this term over time has come to include most parts of 
human life in addition to the classic development projects such as the construction of 
infrastructure. This restrictive view of development, which was common some decades 
ago, is today out-dated. Therefore, the focus on development allows me to depict 
fundamental changes and the evolution of UNRWA’s day-to-day work.  
Protection is a concept widely discussed within the UN. Nonetheless a concrete definition 
of the term is often difficult to find. UNHCR has issued a number of documents on the 
issue, which focus on the aspect of human rights. Protection is generally understood as 
making sure the rights of individuals and groups are respected. Thus it is easy to see why 
the question is relevant to Palestine refugees and UNRWA. Considering the difficult and 
protracted situation of the Palestine refugees it will be easy to prove that huge protection 
gaps exist, without a clear answer of who is responsible for addressing these gaps. In 
contrast to UNHCR, UNRWA does not have an explicit mandate for protection. This is 
due to political and historical reasons, which will be explained in this thesis. 
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For years authors have focused on the protection gap and on the fact that UNRWA does 
not have this explicit mandate. But recent developments within the UN and within 
UNRWA have changed this focus fundamentally. Today UNRWA takes it as a given that 
it possesses a protection mandate. Instead of focusing on the lack of an explicit mandate 
and a comparison with UNHCR, UNRWA now argues that protection is like an implicit 
power, which is inherent to every UN agency. This argument stems from larger UN 
reforms, which have considerably changed international law especially in respect to 
humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty, creating a responsibility to protect, 
which is binding not only on states but also on the UN and all of its agencies as well.  
An additional issue that dazzled me during my time with UNRWA and illuminates the 
agency is the isolation of the agency within the UN system. UNRWA is widely unknown 
even to UN personnel, despite the fact that it is one of the biggest agencies in terms of 
employees: almost 28,000 in UNRWA’s area of operation.1 Furthermore, it is also not 
directly included in any of the efforts to improve coherence within the UN. It is not part 
of the United Nations Development Group (UNDG). It is not a member of the Inter-
Agency Standing Committee (IASC), which was created in the framework of the 
humanitarian reform, and which states on its website that it is a “unique forum involving 
the key UN and non-UN humanitarian partners.”2 And while there is a Protection Cluster 
Working Group headed by UNHCR, which meets regularly, and UNRWA has 
considerable experience in the field of protection, as shown in this thesis, it attends these 
meetings as an observer only. A result of this isolation is the fact that UNRWA enjoys 
relative autonomy within the UN and can take important decisions without receiving 
much internal UN attention. In addition to UNRWA’s unique mandate, which will be 
explained later on, this is a special characteristic of the agency, which has important 
implications for the functioning of the agency. This blind spot towards UNRWA by the 
wider public but also within the UN further added to my interest to write about the 
agency.  
Finally, when writing about UNRWA the manifold criticism that is brought against the 
agency must be addressed. In addition to the accusation that UNRWA is biased and 
indirectly supports terrorism, voices of criticism are directed towards UNRWA’s 
                                                 
1
 UNRWA in figures, 30 June 2008. UNRWA’s five fields of operation are Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, 
Syria and Jordan.  
2
 IASC-Website http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/content/default.asp (Download 15 October 2008).  
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existence itself. These voices state that UNRWA perpetuates the refugee problem and that 
without its assistance the refugees might have been absorbed into the Arab host countries. 
However, the refugee problem in itself depends on a multitude of actors, UNRWA being 
just one of them, and arguably not the most powerful. Answers to this political deadlock 
are beyond the scope of this thesis. While criticism of the agency is certainly valid, 
UNRWA was created by the General Assembly and can therefore not be made 
responsible for its own existence. What remains to be addressed is the question if 
UNRWA did everything to make itself dispensible and prepare for the time when it will 
no longer be needed. It is sometimes stated that UNRWA as an organisation tries to 
secure its own existence instead of preparing for dissolution. But was it really dynamics 
within UNRWA that ever more expanded its mandate, therefore ensuring that Palestine 
refugees have remained dependent on its services? This is also one of the underlying 
questions, which this thesis seeks to answer.  
This thesis will explore the ways in which the real role of the UNRWA is more 
complicated than the critics make it out to be. UNRWA has to be understood as an 
agency that is directly connected to a broader problem, the impossible situation of the 
large group of Palestine refugees. One major hallmark of this refugee problem is the 
situation of limbo in which they find themselves, due to political reasons. For 60 years, 
Palestinian refugees have lived in temporary arrangements due to the fact that there is no 
solution that can be agreed upon by all parties concerned.  
Much of UNRWA’s work is handicapped by the fact that it operates in a field of such 
political tensions, and that it has no impact on many of the factors that influence its work. 
On top of that, the frequent instability in the political situation forces UNRWA to 
continuously adapt its strategies.  
 
2. The History and Work of UNRWA in the Light of the Arab-
Israeli Conflict 
Especially in the aftermath of World War Two the international community 
acknowledged that refugees deserve special protection under international law. The 
creation of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the 1951 
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Convention relating to the Status of Refugees are symptoms of this acknowledgement. It 
was decided that there was to be only one particular group of refugees excluded from the 
UNHCR as well as the 1951 Convention: refugees from Palestine.3  
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
(UNRWA) was established under General Assembly resolution 302 (IV) of December 
1949 and began operations in May 1950.4 Since the creation of UNHCR, UNRWA has 
been the only United Nations agency set up for one specific refugee problem.5 The 
reasons for this will be subject of chapter 5.2.1. In the present chapter the reader will be 
provided with information about the events that led to the creation of UNRWA, as well as 
with a brief overview of UNRWA’s work, a definition of the term Palestine/Palestinian 
refugee and the numbers of these refugees.  
 
2.1. Conflict over Palestine 
In the course of history the territory that is now Israel/Palestine has been ruled and owned 
by a number of different peoples. The Jewish people ruled the Land of Israel between 
1200BCE and the second century AD. The Romans conquered the land and renamed it 
Palaestina.6 From 636 AD until 1099 Palestine was under Arab rule. Then the Crusaders 
ruled for nearly 100 years until the Mamluks took over followed by the Turks, who made 
Palestine part of their Ottoman Empire for the next 400 years. During the First World 
War the British captured it from the Turks. During the Ottoman Empire Jewish 
immigration was allowed, but because their numbers were small the Arab population 
showed “little resentment”7 towards them. In 1881, there were about 450,000 Arabs in 
Palestine (90% Muslim, 10% Christians) and about 25,000 Jews.8  
In 1897, Theodor Herzl organized the First Zionist Congress in Basel which intended to 
create a sovereign state for the Jewish people.9 But this effort was not taken seriously by 
                                                 
3
 Takkenberg, Lex: The Status of Palestinian Refugees in International Law, Claredon Press, Oxford, 1998, 
p.6.  
4
 UNRWA Website, www.un.org/unrwa (Download 2 September 2008).  
5
 Takkenberg, 1998, p.29.  
6
 Morris, Benny: 1948, Yale University Press, New Haven/London 2008, p.1.  
7
 Takkenberg, 1998, p.8 
8
 Morris, 2008, p.2.  
9
 The exact wording was to establish a “publicly and legally secured home [Heimstätte]”. According to 
Morris the reason for this wording was that the Congress did not want to alarm the Ottoman rulers, but the 
intent to create a sovereign state existed. Morris, 2008, p.5.  
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the Arabs until much later. In 1917, the Balfour Declaration made it impossible for the 
Arabs to further ignore the possible establishment of a Jewish state. A.J. Balfour, the 
Foreign Secretary in the British wartime cabinet at the time declared to Lord Rothschild, 
the British Jewish leader that Britain would support the establishment of a “national home 
for the Jewish people” in Palestine.10  
In the first two decades of settlement there was little Arab violence against the Zionists, 
except occasional acts of violence of criminal nature. According to Morris, this was due 
to the fact that the “Arabs lacked political, nationalist awareness and were thoroughly 
disorganized.”11 First anti-Jewish rioting occurred in 1921 and 1929. British attempts to 
restrict Jewish immigration lead to Jewish riots in 1933, the same year that the Nazi 
government in Germany came into power, which gave the Zionist cause further leverage 
and urgency.12 In the interwar period a Palestinian national movement emerged, which 
led to riots and a full-scale revolt against Britain and the Jews from 1936 until 1939.13 In 
1937, the Peel Commission suggested dividing Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state. 
This plan was accepted by the Zionists but rejected by the Arabs.  
Tensions were ongoing, including Jewish terrorism against Britain. Britain, therefore, 
wanted to withdraw from Palestine and “dumped the matter in the lap of the United 
Nations”.14 In 1947, the General Assembly presented a partition plan in resolution 181 
(II).15 It called for the creation of an Arab and a Jewish state by October 1948. The 
division plan was a “much more sophisticated version of the one suggested by the Peel 
Commission ten years earlier”.16 The British mandate should be terminated and there 
should be a progressive withdrawal of British forces and the establishment of a Jewish 
state and an Arab state. Jerusalem should be under international regime.17 The Arab state 
should comprise a much larger version of what is now the West Bank, a longer and L-
shaped Gaza Strip as well as the land west and north-west of the Sea of Galilee up to the 
Lebanese border.18 The rest would have become the Jewish state and Jerusalem would 
                                                 
10
 Cit. in Takkenberg, 1998, p.9.  
11
 Morris, 2008, p.7.  
12
 Takkenberg, 1998, p.9 
13
 Shlaim, Avi: The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World, Penguin Books, London/New York, 2000, p.10.  
14
 Morris, Benny: The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949, 1987, p.6.  
15
 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 (II) (A+B), Future Government of Palestine, of 29 
November 1947. 
16
 Takkenberg, 1998, p.12.  
17
 Shlaim, 2000, p.25.  
18
 Takkenberg, 1998, p.12.  
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have received international status. The United Nations Palestine Commission was also 
established through this resolution and charged with carrying out the Assembly’s 
recommendations. The Security Council was requested to take the necessary measures to 
implement the partition plan. The partition plan was accepted by the Jewish Agency 
despite criticism on issues such as limited Jewish migration and territorial limits.19 The 
plan was not accepted by the Arab population of Palestine and the Arab states because 
they argued that it meant a violation of the United Nations Charter with respect to the 
right of people to decide their own destiny.20 They claimed the resolution was illegal and 
announced that they would resist its implementation by force.21 
The adoption of resolution 181 led to outbreaks of violence in many parts of Palestine. 
Just one day after the last British troops had withdrawn war broke out when a number of 
Arab states joined the conflict.22 
The war ended with the signing of the armistice agreements in 1949; yet, formal peace 
agreements didn’t follow immediately.23 Already in December 1948, the United Nations 
Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) had been created by General Assembly 
resolution 194 (III) – which also contained the right of return of Palestine refugees – to 
provide protection and facilitate durable solutions for the displaced as a result of conflict 
and war from 1947 to 1948. The Commission is composed of the United States, France 
and Turkey. It is the only body explicitly charged with the protection of Palestine 
refugees, but has been dysfunctional since the early 1950s.24 One of the commission’s 
sub-organs was the Economic Survey Mission for long and short term economic relief. 
The conclusions of this mission resulted in the creation of UNRWA by the General 
Assembly as a reaction to the great humanitarian need of the Palestine refugees.25 
 
                                                 
19
 Takkenberg, 1998, p.12.  
20
 Takkenberg, 1998, p.12.  
21
 Shlaim, 2000, p.27.  
22
 Takkenberg, 1998, p.12.  
23
 Morris, 2008, p.416.  
24
 Rempel, Terry M.: The United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Protection, and a 
Durable Solution for Palestinian Refugees, BADIL Information & Discussion Brief no.5, June 2000. See 
also chapter 3.5.1.  
25
 Rempel, The United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Protection, and a Durable Solution 
for Palestinian Refugees, 2000, and United Nations Press Release PAL/534, Gordon Clapp speaks on the 
work of the UN Economic Survey for the Middle East, 13 October 1949.  
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2.2. UNRWA's Work as a Humanitarian Actor 
UNRWA was founded in 1949 by General Assembly resolution 302 (IV) to carry out 
direct relief and works projects for Palestine refugees in the Near East. Today UNRWA 
operates in Gaza, the West Bank, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. It divides its operations into 
five categories: Education, Health, Relief and Social Services, Microfinance and 
Microenterprise Programme, and Operational and Technical Services.26 Education is its 
biggest programme with around 60% of UNRWA’s budget and two-thirds of staff. There 
are 663 elementary and preparatory schools providing education for nearly half a million 
refugee children.27 The Agency is also the prime health care provider for Palestine 
refugees.  
Today there are about 4.4 million Palestine refugees registered with UNRWA.28 The 
agency employs around 28,000 people, the majority of which are Palestine refugees 
themselves. Only around 11329 employees are international staff, who are on the payroll 
of the general UN budget.30  
Development work and humanitarian assistance are two different concepts that may 
overlap in some instances. In this paper the difference between the two will be defined in 
the following way: humanitarian assistance (such as relief) addresses basic and acute 
needs that occur from a current crisis or an ongoing situation of poverty – in contrast to 
development work/assistance, which tries to achieve long lasting improvement of a 
situation. UNRWA was created as a relief agency in response to the acute needs of 
Palestine refugees in 1949. In addition it should provide some work for the people 
affected, therefore the name relief and works agency. Since its creation the functioning 
has changed significantly. According to the above definition, four of UNRWA’s five 
categories of services fall under development work, as opposed to humanitarian 
assistance. Today relief and social services make up for 10% of the total budget, as 
compared to nearly two thirds in 1950 when the Agency started operations in May 
1950.31 Still the agency remains a crucial actor in this respect, providing a safety net and 
                                                 
26
 The last category contains housing and infrastructure projects. UNRWA, Medium Term Plan 2005-2009, 
p.34.  
27
 UNRWA: UNRWA in 2006, Gaza, September 2007, p.16.  
28
 UNRWA in 2006, p.8.  
29
 UNRWA in figures, December 2007.  
30
 The general UNRWA budget is made up of voluntary contributions. UNRWA in 2006, p.8.  
31
 UNRWA, General Fund Appeal 2008-2009, p.9 and 22.  
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responding to the various crises in its fields of operation – especially in the OPT and in 
Lebanon. In the OPT dependency on UNRWA aid handouts has reached unprecedented 
levels.32 In Gaza 35 percent of the population live on less than two US dollars a day, and 
80 percent receive humanitarian assistance.33  
 
2.3. Definition of Palestine Refugee 
One has to differentiate between the term Palestinian refugee and Palestine refugee. The 
term Palestine refugee relates to any person who resided on the territory which was 
Mandate Palestine at the time, who had to flee this territory, and their descendants – 
irrespective of the person’s nationality. Palestinian refugee on the other hand refers only 
to the Arab population.34  
Whereas UNRWA always talks about Palestine refugees, others, like Takkenberg, use the 
term Palestinian refugees in their studies. Takkenberg argues that in international law it is 
only the people who fled Palestine who had an Arab background and who where not 
nationals of other states who fulfil the characteristics of this special group of refugees 
who lack international protection.35 
In the theoretical discussion of the status of the refugees this distinction is important. To 
UNRWA’s practical work it is less relevant, because only 1.5 per cent of those registered 
have a different national background.36  
In this study the author will use the term Palestinian refugee in Chapter three, which 
covers the issue of protection, because protection is mostly related to legal issues in 
which the characteristics discussed apply to the former Arab population of Palestine and 
their descendants and not to the small group of Palestine refugees who belong to other 
                                                 
32
 UNRWA, Emergency Appeal 2008, Gaza, November 2007, p.5.  
33
 Koning AbuZayd, Karen: This brutal siege of Gaza can only breed violence, The Guardian, 23 January 
2008, http://www.un.org/unrwa/news/articles/2008/Guardian_23jan08.html (Download 11 September 
2008).  
34
 Takkenberg, 1998, p.41.  
35
 Ibid., p.51.  
36
 Takkenberg, 1998, p.50.  
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nationalities. The rest of the study will mostly37 use the term Palestine refugee because 
that is the term used by UNRWA.  
No official document has defined who is a Palestine refugee, in the sense that he or she 
should be provided services by UNRWA.38 Therefore, UNRWA has come up with its 
own definition which reads as follows:  
“Under UNRWA's operational definition, Palestine refugees are persons whose 
normal place of residence was Palestine between June 1946 and May 1948, who 
lost both their homes and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli 
conflict. UNRWA's services are available to all those living in its area of 
operations who meet this definition, who are registered with the Agency and who 
need assistance.”39 
The terms registered refugees or UNRWA registered refugees refers to the group of 
refugees that fall under this definition.  
Although this definition relates exclusively to persons displaced as a result of the 1948 
conflict, UNRWA has extended its assistance to refugees displaced during 1967 as well 
as internally displaced persons (IDPs) in emergency situations and even to non-
refugees.40  
The refugee status is passed on to the descendants of Palestine refugees, which is the 
reason for the stark increase in the number of refugees since the creation of the problem. 
This has been a matter of criticism because with other refugee groups this is not the case 
and it means that the refugee population does not automatically dissolve with the death of 
the population which originally had to flee. Daniel Pipes, in an article in the New York 
Post in 2003, states that for the Palestine refugees, “the refugee status continues from one 
generation to the next, creating an ever-larger pool of anguish and discontent.” He goes 
                                                 
37
 Since many sources use the term Palestinian refugee the exclusive use of the term Palestine refugee 
cannot be guaranteed.  
38 Lapidoth, Ruth: Legal Aspects of the Palestinian Refugee Question, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 
Jerusalem Letter No.485, 1 September 2002.  
39
 UNRWA Website, Who is a Palestine Refugee?, http://www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/whois.html 
(Download 11 September 2008).  
40
 Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA to the General Assembly, 16 September 1988, par.32. 
Henceforth annual reports by the Director or Commissioner-General of UNRWA will be referred to as 
UNRWA, Annual Report, followed by the year, which it covers. Until 2006 the period of reporting went 
from 1 July to 30 June of the following year. Since 2006 it covers the period between 1 January and 31 
December. 
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on to call for the dismantling of UNRWA. “It's high time to help these generations of 
non-refugees escape the refugee status so they can become citizens, assume self-
responsibility and build for the future.” Of course this argumentation leaves out that the 
deprivation of refugee status would by no means lead to the end of the refugee problem. 
Furthermore he does not state of what country they should become citizens, therewith 
neglecting the fact that no country is willing to provide the refugees with citizenship.41 
Criticism also included the accusation of gender-based discrimination, since in the case of 
children from one refugee and one non-refugee parent, only the children of refugee 
fathers were considered refugees.42 In 2006 it was decided to extend UNRWA services to 
women who are married to non-refugees and their children, resulting in an increase of 
360.000 new beneficiaries across the five fields.43 
 
2.4. How Many Refugees Are there?  
Palestine refugees today make up the biggest group of refugees worldwide.44 At the same 
time this issue is one of the longest-standing refugee problems in history.45 Today 
Palestinian refugees (about 5 million) represent approximately 18% of the total number of 
refugees in the world.46 The largest group of refugees were displaced during the 1948 war 
following the creation of the State of Israel.47 UNRWA registered refugees represent 
approximately three quarters of Palestinian refugees world-wide. Roughly every second 
Palestinian in the world is a recipient of UNRWA services.48 The majority of them reside 
in the neighbouring Arab countries and the OPT, about one third of UNRWA registered 
refugees live in refugee camps in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Gaza, and the West Bank.49  
The number of refugees who fled Palestine between 1947 and 1948 is much contested and 
ranges between 520,000 and 900,000. The first is the number Israeli spokesmen referred 
                                                 
41
 Daniel Pipe: The Refugee Curse, New York Post, 19 August 2003. 
42
 Cervenak, C.M.: Promoting Inequality: Gender-Based Discrimination in UNRWA’s Approach to 
Palestine Refugee Status, Human Rights Quarterly; vol.16, No.2 p.300-374 (1994), p.302.  
43
 UNRWA, General Fund Appeal 2008-2009, p.18.  
44
 Farah, Randa: The Marginalization of Palestinian Refugees, in: Steiner/Gibney/Loescher: Problems of 
Protection: The UNHCR, Refugees, and Human Rights, Routledge, New York/London, 2003, pp. 155-178, 
p.155.  
45
 Rempel, Terry M.: UN General Assembly Resolution 194(III) and the framework for durable solutions 
for 1948 Palestinian refugees, Paper prepared for the BADIL Expert Forum, 22-23 May, 2003, p.2. 
46
 UNRWA: statistical profiles: general, p.1. 
47
 Rempel, 2003, p.3.  
48
 UNRWA: statistical profiles: general, p.1. 
49
 UNRWA in figures, December 2007.  
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to in public whereas the second is the number Arab spokesmen used from 1949 
onwards.50 Even within UNRWA the numbers are not used in a consistent manner. 
Initially, the Agency together with the United Nations Economic Survey Mission put the 
figure at 726,000.51 Today UNRWA talks of “about 800,000” who fled between 1947 and 
1948.52 
A well-known and detailed account of the numbers and the events around the exodus was 
provided by Benny Morris, an Israeli historian in 1987, after State archives of Israel had 
been made accessible to historians.53 Morris is part of a group of Israeli historians whose 
work is referred to as revisionist historiography or new historiography (a term preferred 
by Morris)54 because they brought to light new insights into the history of the 1948 war 
and the creation of the state of Israel. He contributed a great deal to the dismantling of 
much of the official Israeli versions about the exodus as propaganda and gave credibility 
to the much higher number of expelled Palestinians that was alleged by Palestinian 
historians. Nonetheless some of his theses are also being contested especially by 
Palestinian historians (for example Walid Khalidi and Nur Masalha55), who claim that 
there were Zionist transfer plans that aimed at expelling the Palestinian population, 
whereas Morris states that there had been no such plans. 
“The Palestinian refugee problem was born of war, not by design, Jewish or Arab. 
It was largely a by-product of Arab and Jewish fears and of the protracted, bitter 
fighting that characterised the first Israeli-Arab war.”56 
According to Ilan Pappé, Morris “wishes mainly to convey a complicated and multi-
causal explanation for the flight, trying to put forward a version which on the one hand 
rejects the Israeli claim of voluntary flight and on the other, the Palestinian narrative of 
mass expulsion.” But, he goes on, “this position is rejected by several Palestinian 
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historians as well as by my own work. So, while the “new history” of Israel comes close 
to the Palestinian historical narrative, fundamental gaps still remain.”57 
UNRWA itself stated in 1950:  
“An accurate statement of the number of genuine refugees resulting from the war 
in Palestine is unlikely to be provided now or in the future. In fact, it is almost 
impossible to define closely the word "refugee," as applied to the work of the 
Agency, without leaving certain groups of deserving people outside those 
accepted, or conversely, including groups who probably should not be in receipt of 
relief.”58  
The Palestine-based NGO Badil makes the following estimate for the year 2003: 
“It is estimated that there were more than 7 million Palestinian refugees and 
displaced persons at the beginning of 2003. This includes Palestinian refugees 
displaced in 1948 and registered for assistance with the UN Relief and Works 
Agency (UNRWA) (3.97 million); Palestinian refugees displaced in 1948 but not 
registered for assistance (1.54 million); Palestinian refugees displaced for the first 
time in 1967 (753,000); 1948  internally displaced Palestinians (274,000); and, 
1967 internally displaced Palestinians (150,000).”59 
The number of refugees remains a political one because the refugee issue is one of the 
major bones of contention concerning a just solution to the conflict. It is connected to the 
right of return and to questions of compensation.60 
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3. International Organisations and UNRWA in International 
Law 
 
3.1. The Extension of Competencies in International Law 
This paragraph gives an overview of the competencies of International Organisations and 
their potential to adapt their mandates and competencies to up-coming challenges. 
Questions to be answered include the following: Do international organisations and 
subsidiary organs have to stick exactly to the ideas of the institutions or countries that 
created them or are they allowed to be independent in certain ways? Are they competent 
to change and expand their own mandate or is that illegitimate? The author wants to put 
the question of the evolution of UNRWA’s mandate in perspective by giving some 
examples where the competencies of international organisations were expanded or more 
clearly defined. 
The status of international organisations in international law has changed over time and 
has been subject of wide discussion. In various events the legal status has been re-
evaluated therefore changing international law in this respect.61 Already in 1949 after the 
death of Count Bernadotte, who was assassinated during the exercise of his functions as 
UN mediator for Palestine, the famous advisory opinion of the International Court of 
Justice, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,62 had to 
face the issue if the United Nations Organisation was in the position to pursue a claim or 
if only the mediator’s nation state was in the position to do so. The Court stated that up 
front it had to decide whether the UN was an international person. It gave an affirmative 
answer, stating that in order to fulfil its mandate this was necessary. It further went on to 
declare what the implications of this decision were.  
“This is not the same thing as saying that it is a State, which it certainly is not, or 
that its legal personality and rights and duties are the same as those of a State. Still 
less is it the same thing as saying that it is a “super-State,” whatever that 
expression may mean. (...) What it does mean is that it is a subject of international 
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law and capable of possessing international rights and duties, and that it has 
capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims.”63  
This is an example where the status of an international organisation was not entirely clear 
when it was founded, but had to be determined when the issue came up. Another citation 
of the same advisory opinion adds further clarification to the reasoning of the court. 
“Under international law, the Organization must be deemed to have those powers 
which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by 
necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties.”64  
This principle had already been applied to the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in 
an advisory opinion by the ICJ in 1926.65 It is commonly referred to as the principle of 
implied powers. It is based on the notion that the rules that are laid down in any treaty 
presuppose the existence of certain other rules without which the treaty could not be 
reasonably applied.66  
UNHCR has successfully adapted its mandate in a couple of instances. Originally, the 
1951 Geneva Convention extended its protecting function only to refugees who were 
uprooted by events relating to the Second World War in Europe. The 1967 protocol to the 
Refugee Convention achieved the abolition of this restrictive definition, concerning the 
date and the geographical area.67 Later on, world-wide political developments created 
changing realities concerning the refugee situation. More people became refugees in their 
own land – so-called internally displaced persons (IDPs). These do not fulfil the 
conditions for being included in the traditional definition of a refugee, still they are needy 
persons and in many instances do not enjoy the protection of their nation state. UNHCR 
took up this task – and was supported by the international community.68 
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These examples show that in fact evolution and change within international organisations 
is not rare and illicit but happen frequently and can constitute a necessary means in order 
to face changing realities.69 It will have to be determined whether UNRWA’s adaptations 
concerning development and towards more protection are an example of this necessary 
change or if they go beyond the need to adapt, in order to fulfil its functions and reach its 
goals.  
 
3.2. UNRWA: A Subsidiary Organ of the United Nations 
The UN charter contains explicit provisions creating the competency for the General 
Assembly, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council to create subsidiary 
organs. Article 7 is the general provision and article 22 specifies the case for the General 
Assembly – the organ that created UNRWA. A large number of subsidiary organs have 
been created. In its first 20 sessions the General Assembly exercised this right more than 
180 times.70 Subsidiary organs are classified into five broad categories: 1. Study 
committees to facilitate the consideration of subjects by the Assembly; 2. Political 
commissions and other organs having active political responsibility; 3. Organs of 
administrative assistance; 4. Operational agencies; and 5. Judicial bodies.71 Their size 
varies considerably. In some of them all member states of the UN are represented, which 
is the case for UNCTAD for example, and others consist of one single person, such as the 
United Nations Mediator for Palestine.72 UNRWA, as well as for instance UNICEF, 
UNHCR and the WFP, fall under the fourth category of operational agency. One has to 
distinguish between a subsidiary organ of the UN, like UNRWA, and specialized 
agencies. Many of the latter have existed on their own terms and were later associated 
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with the UN. Other specialized agencies have been created under article 57 of the UN 
Charter. They differ from the subsidiary organs in the respect that they were created by 
treaty as opposed to by resolution. This difference is significant for a number of 
arguments.  The treaty defines characteristics and powers of the agency. In addition, 
parties to a treaty have agreed to these rules when they signed the treaty. In regard to 
subsidiary organs this consent might be absent, for instance when they were created by 
majority decision.  
According to Bale, subsidiary organs, “being founded by mere resolution of a 
principal organ, usually drawn up in wide and general terms, are placed at some 
disadvantage. This is especially true of the operational agencies. There may well 
be no instrument defining with any particularity the powers of such an agency in 
the countries in which it operates, and nothing to state the obligations towards it of 
the government of those countries, save for the very broad provision of Article 2, 
paragraph 5, of the Charter, which requires all members to give to the “United 
Nations” every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter.”73 
In addition, treaties might provide for sufficient funding of the agency. In fact it is a 
distinctive feature of operational agencies that they are financed through voluntary 
contributions by states or other institutions.74 This puts them in a financially fragile 
situation – an issue that has been problematic for UNRWA from the start.75 
Being a subsidiary organ does not prevent UNRWA itself from having legal personality. 
Legal personality “is a prerequisite for the capacity to bear rights and obligations.”76 
Without this personality UNRWA would be unable to be party to treaties, present claims 
against other international persons, or possess any other rights or duties. UNRWA has 
repeatedly been in front of national courts,77 has made legally binding agreements and 
commercial contracts with host countries, it has acquired pieces of land, and frequently 
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claims compensation for the violation of agreements by the host countries, especially 
Israel.78 Therefore is had been concluded that UNRWA does possess legal personality.79  
 
3.3. The Mandate of UNRWA 
The mandate of UNRWA can be drawn from a series of General Assembly resolutions, 
but a clear and official description of what this mandate entails is absent. While it was 
originally founded with the mission to “to carry out (...) direct relief and works 
programmes (...)”,80 different wording was included in later resolutions.81 In UNRWA’s 
annual report presented to the General Assembly in 1973 the Commissioner-General 
pointed out some of the difficulties that result from this situation.  
“It is against this background of General Assembly resolutions that UNRWA must 
carry out its mandate, with little specific guidance from the resolutions conferring 
that mandate, which, in effect, has come to consist of maintaining, to the extend 
UNRWA’s resources permit, the programmes it has gradually developed over the 
years.”82 
Later on, referring to considerable cuts that had to be made in the education programme 
he continued: 
“A decision with such serious political consequences and such ominous 
implications for peace and security is not an administrative matter to be dealt with 
by an appointed official. It is a decision that ought to be taken at a governmental 
level, and in the absence of a governing body for UNRWA with executive 
responsibilities, the Commissioner-General must seek and receive guidance and 
directions from the General Assembly.”83 
This call for guidance from the General Assembly is an example for difficulties that can 
arise from this lack of a clear mandate. The internal structure of UNRWA is not one of an 
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autonomous international organization where a clear decision-making process is likely to 
be determined by the founding treaty, with a voting procedure including the votes of 
Member States. UNRWA, as a subsidiary body and operational agency of the UN, is 
supposed to carry out a mission previously defined by the organ which founded it, the 
General Assembly. But, as expressed in the above example, UNRWA’s work is not 
always free from political decisions, leaving the Commissioner-General in a powerful and 
sometimes difficult situation, which might exceed the competencies to which he/she was 
meant to be entitled by the General Assembly.  
 
3.4. Reasons for the Extension of Competencies within UNRWA 
In this section focus will be on the reasons for change in the work of UNRWA and for the 
change of its mandate and/or its competencies. The underlying questions are: why did 
UNRWA change? Who initiated this change? Was it a natural process of adaptation or 
was it forced by one of the actors concerned? Is UNRWA a passive player in this setting 
reacting to facts on the ground or is it the designer of its own structure and functioning? 
What are the interests involved? 
Already in 1950 the mandate of UNRWA had been subject to change by the General 
Assembly. In resolution 393 of 2 December 1950 the General Assembly included the 
issues repatriation and resettlement,84 which meant an involvement of UNRWA in the 
search for a durable solution. Yet, this engagement was of very short duration, because of 
strong opposition and controversy concerning the engagement of UNRWA in this 
difficult field.85  
Following the six-days-war in 1967 UNRWA was asked by the General Assembly to 
extend its services also to groups of refugees that are not “registered refugees”, that is 
1948 refugees. In resolution 2252 of 4 July 1967, in paragraph 6, the General Assembly 
“endorses, (…) the efforts of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to provide 
humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a 
                                                 
84
 General Assembly resolution, 393 (V), 3 December 1950, par.4.  
85
 UNRWA, Annual Report, 1961/1962, par.12.  
 22 
 
temporary measure, to other persons in the area who are at present displaced and 
are in serious need of immediate assistance as a result of the recent hostilities.”86 
Following the invasion of southern Lebanon by Israel the General Assembly passed a 
series of resolutions calling for increased efforts by the UN towards protection of 
Palestine refugees in the occupied territories. General Assembly resolution 38/83 “urges 
the Secretary-General, in consultations with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, to undertake effective measures to guarantee the 
safety and security and the legal and human rights of Palestine refugees in all the 
territories under Israeli occupation.”87 As a result of these resolutions the Commissioner-
General of UNRWA had to draw attention to the fact that, in his eyes, responsibility 
should go with power and that under international law it is for the occupying power to 
ensure that the civil and other rights of the inhabitants of the territory are safeguarded.88 
As we can see, in the two cases mentioned above it was clearly the General Assembly 
who called for the enlargement of UNRWA’s mandate.  
Also, the advisory commission of UNRWA welcomed the extension of UNRWA 
competencies in many instances. In 1988 the Chairman of the Advisory Commission was 
in favour of increased services to Palestine refugees in the occupied territory following 
the outbreak of the first intifada. 
“The members of the Commission were gratified to learn of the steps the Agency 
has already taken to increase its ability to respond quickly to the need for 
providing additional assistance and protection to refugees in the occupied 
territories through the assignment of additional international staff to the UNRWA 
Field Offices in Jerusalem and Gaza. They urge the Commissioner-General, in co-
ordination with other international organizations and voluntary agencies, to seek 
ways to assist in monitoring the maintenance of basic civil and human rights 
there.”89 
In some instances UNRWA took emergency measures on its own initiative, which were 
subsequently approved by the Advisory Commission and the General Assembly. 
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“The members (of the Advisory Commission) believe that the emergency 
measures UNRWA has already taken in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to 
alleviate hardships resulting from recent developments should be continued for as 
long as they are found to be needed.”90 
Examples can be found where UNRWA took a critical position towards its own existence 
and work. In the annual report of 1953 concerns were raised on the nature of UNRWA’s 
relief services in its host countries. 
“There is something incongruous in the presence of an alien organization, 
however well-intentioned, furnishing the basic necessities for a large proportion of 
the population of a country, particularly when--as in the commendable case of 
Jordan--the refugees have been made full citizens of the State. The period of acute 
emergency is past, when the efforts of the international community were gladly 
accepted, and the Agency is becoming something of an embarrassment to the host 
governments.”91 
In its early years the agency advocated the restriction of its role to financial and technical 
assistance and was in favour of referring responsibility for its relief programme to the 
host governments.  
“It would (…) be more appropriate for the governments to relieve themselves of 
the complications inherent in the presence of UNRWA and to assume the 
responsibility for the administration of the relief programme. The suggestion is not 
a new one: the three-year plan itself anticipated the withdrawal of the Agency 
from an active role into one of financial and technical assistance to 
governments.”92 
So far it can be concluded that the most important changes in the mandate of UNRWA 
were initiated or endorsed by the General Assembly and/or the Advisory Commission. 
And that UNRWA itself at times was not afraid to question its own mandate. It did 
assume new responsibilities without mandate in case of emergencies, but it does not seem 
to be the one who initiated these steps. None of the above-mentioned incidents can serve 
as an example of UNRWA trying to maintain its existence and therefore violating its 
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commitment to work towards a solution where it would no longer be needed. It will have 
to be discussed if the same holds true for the aspect of protection. But, what could be the 
reasons for the general support of UNRWA and the extension of its mandate by the 
General Assembly during the last 6 decades? The rest of this chapter will address this 
question. 
It will be shown that despite widespread criticism of the Agency there are a multitude of 
reasons why many of the actors concerned are in favour of the work of UNRWA. These 
interests vary considerably, and sometimes their motives can be put into question, still it 
can be argued that service to Palestine refugees and maybe more generally the care for the 
relative well-being of this group is important for various political reasons – in addition to 
the obvious humanitarian reasons. 
Palestine refugees constitute a heavy economic and social burden, to a different extent in 
Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. Also to a different extent are these countries opposed to a 
complete integration of the refugees in the host societies.93 As a consequence, although 
many Palestine refugees have become self-sufficient, others remain in need of 
humanitarian assistance. Roughly every second Palestinian in the world is a recipient of 
UNRWA services.94 It is in the Arab countries’ interest that UNRWA provides basic 
services for many Palestine refugees because it takes the edge off the criticism of those 
governments addressing discrimination and the lack of integration. Furthermore, without 
UNRWA the governments themselves would have to provide for these basic services, 
which would increase the burden of the refugees. 
In December 1949, when the UN passed resolution 302 creating UNRWA, Israel voted in 
favour of this resolution.95 Not denying the existence of moral reasons for this decision, 
one can argue that also for political reasons the creation of UNRWA was in the interest of 
the State of Israel. It meant the international community paying for basic services to the 
refugees who had fled the area of mandate Palestine following the creation of Israel and 
the 1948 war. Israel did not and still does not allow the refugees to return. This decision 
caused and still causes strong protest among the refugees but also among various pressure 
groups, NGOs and concerned individuals and governments all over the world. It is safe to 
say that it is in Israel’s national interest to ensure the well-being of the refugees because it 
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might diminish their determination to return to their homelands. Of course, resettlement 
or integration of the refugees would be welcomed even more, but since this has not been 
realized due to the opposition of host countries and refugees, the relative well-being of 
the refugee population in this “interim” situation is still welcome in as far as it has a 
pacifying effect.  
The western donors, especially the USA and the European Union, have been in favour of 
the existence of UNRWA and are its main donors.96 Political reasons are less obvious 
concerning these countries. The contributions might be founded on humanitarian reasons, 
or follow a broader foreign policy that includes geopolitical interests in the region. Still it 
is not unjustified to suppose that financial contributions to the “Palestinian side” might 
function as compensation for the inability to help to resolve the conflict or possibly for 
one-sidedness in favour of the State of Israel.  
The motives of the United Nations have been questioned as well. For example by Giorgio 
Giacomelli, Commissioner-General of UNRWA in 1988: 
“Ever since the adoption of resolution 302 (IV), the (General) Assembly has 
looked upon UNRWA as an organ by which it seeks to discharge part of its 
responsibilities concerning the Palestine question.”97 
UNRWA has existed for almost 60 years and efforts to dissolve it have never been 
serious. This, again, is due to the fact that over-all the actors involved have reasons to 
keep the agency alive.  
4. UNRWA's Role as a Development Agency 
 
UNRWA describes itself as a “human development” agency.98 The reason for this might 
be to stress its focus directly on humans as opposed to infrastructure. In the author’s view 
there is no doubt that the agency can be labelled development agency due to the fact that 
89 percent of its budget are directed towards the achievement of goals that are labelled 
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with this term.99 One could assign one of the Millennium Development Goals to almost 
all of UNRWA’s activities. Still they are not perceived as being a development agency. 
This is reflected in the fact that UNRWA is not a member of the United Nations 
Development Group.100  
In history the term development was used in a slightly different way by UNRWA. 
Today’s general understanding of the term is based on a wholesome approach, where 
almost all aspects of life are included. Today, the label human development agency is 
generally accepted to be appropriate for UNRWA, in the annual report of the year 1962 
the term development is only used in connection with “large scale development projects”. 
In these early years of the agency’s work, these development projects stood also for the 
Agency’s efforts to provide a long lasting solution for the refugees through resettlement. 
These efforts were only of a short duration because they “were in principle unacceptable 
to the refugees and Arab opinion generally.”101  
All of UNRWA’s areas of operation are recipients of Official Development Aid (ODA). 
UNRWA occupies first place in the list of donors to the OPT, second to Jordan, third to 
the Syrian Arab Republic, and fourth to Lebanon.102 It is therefore safe to say that the 
agency is a major development actor in the region. But how did it come to this evolution? 
Who initiated this adaptation over time?  
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the change that took place within UNRWA 
concerning its development work. From basic relief and humanitarian services the agency 
developed into a provider of quasi-public services. This term should not mislead the 
reader: UNRWA has no mandate for public administration whatsoever. Still especially 
education and health care are traditionally the responsibility of the public authorities of a 
state.  
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Jordan and Syria are listed as Lower Middle Income Countries while Lebanon was listed 
as Upper Middle Income Country in 2006.103 In general Arab responsibility for the 
Palestine refugee plight should not be overlooked.104 At the same time difficult economic 
situations in the Arab countries and the impact of the Palestine refugees in the respective 
countries have to be taken into account.105 This consideration emphasises the urgency for 
UNRWA services.  
There has been an evolution over time towards a more integrated development approach. 
Still there are also signs that indicate that from the outset UNRWA’s creators had 
intended to include elements of development as the term is understood today. This was 
stated by Commissioner-General Peter Hansen on a high-level conference in Geneva in 
2004: 
“In a stroke of vision and good sense, a component was introduced of what today 
is called “development”, “income-generation” and “self-reliance” – the antithesis 
of welfare. This led to the “works” part of our name.”106 
 
4.1. From Technical Assistance to Fully Integrated Development 
Programmes 
In 1950, five months after the beginning of UNRWA operations the director stated that 
much of UNRWA’s work can be understood as “technical assistance”.107 Therefore the 
Agency was never completely restricted to humanitarian services.  
The original focus on technical assistance understood the agency as a consultant. Too 
strong engagement was not desired because hand-over of all the programmes to the 
governments was envisaged within a short period of time. This understanding is reflected 
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in the following citation from UNRWA’s annual report covering the period 1 July 1951 to 
30 June 1952: 
“Rather than attempt to assemble international teams of experts, the Agency 
prefers to provide technical assistance through the co-operation of bilateral 
government programmes or specialized agencies and by contracting with private 
firms. It seeks to ensure that the United Nations will not directly administer loans, 
operate schools, or engage in construction. The Agency, in consultation with 
governments, favors contractual arrangements and the use of governmental 
agencies or intermediate corporations” (emphasis added).108 
This stands in stark contrast to UNRWA’s work today. One of UNRWA’s hallmarks, 
which distinguishes it from most other UN agencies, is that it delivers most of its services 
directly, without subcontracting to other agencies. It employs a vast number of staff, runs 
its own schools giving primary education to almost half a million students, runs health 
care centres and hospitals, offers social security, and has its own construction and 
microcredit programmes.  
Education has been the first area where this change took place. When the United Nations 
first began to budget funds for the Palestine refugees, budgetary efforts were not directed 
to education, since the problem was considered to be a temporary one. It took the UN 
some months without political progress to realize that “something had to be done to 
continue the education of refugee children.”109 From the start high unemployment among 
the refugee population in exile posed difficulties on the younger generation. Children of 
unemployed parents are comparably unlikely to acquire work-related skills from their 
parents. In addition to this, Commissioner-General Davis pointed out in 1962 that many 
of the young refugees had lower self-discipline, because they could not see this attitude in 
their parents’ daily life.110 UNRWA identified this problem and its risk for the future of 
the refugee population and consequently enlarged its role in education. In the early 1960s 
UNRWA held its relief services on the same level, and “concentrated all available 
resources on the expansion and improvement of its education programme”.111  
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This emphasis and redistribution of sources had been explained in two consecutive 
sessions of the General Assembly and had not met any objections.112 As mentioned above 
UNRWA’s role is also defined by decisions and abilities of host countries. The emphasis 
on education resulted from the fact that these countries found it “virtually impossible to 
provide sufficient educational opportunity for refugee children, and it is for this reason 
that UNRWA has found it necessary to engage in and support education for the refugee 
children”.113 According to the annual report of 1962 “UNRWA has assumed this role with 
considerable reluctance”.114 The trend continued over the years. Until 1967, before the 
outbreak of the 1967 war, costs for relief services and health had stagnated (despite rising 
costs and an increasing number of registered refugees) but the budget for education rose 
from US$ 14 million in 1963 to 16.5 million in 1967.115 We may conclude that education 
was introduced in UNRWA’s work due to necessity and the lack of other options. 
UNRWA did not actively seek this new mandate but it did continue actively by 
expanding the education programme massively over the years. 
Another aspect of UNRWA’s work where changes took place are the works programmes. 
One reason for the need for these programmes were the difficulties Palestine refugees 
faced integrating into their host country’s economies. In 1948 the majority (70 percent) of 
the Arab population of Palestine were farmers. Of the urban population about two thirds 
possessed skills, that enabled them to find employment in the host countries. These 
workers, and their descendants, (about 20 percent of those displaced), never became 
dependant of UNRWA’s services. The remaining 80 percent, who again were mostly 
farmers, small businessmen and unskilled workers became dependant on UNRWA.116 In 
1962 the Commissioner-General of UNRWA, John H. Davis, pointed out that the 
situation of the young refugees, who achieved adulthood in the refugee community was 
matter of great concern to the future of the refugee population. Many of them were not 
only unemployed but as Davis put it “unemployable”, due to the lack of work related and 
social skills.117 The works programme has been under scrutiny because it was closely 
connected to the issue of resettlement and integration into the host countries. In the 1962 
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Commissioner-General’s report to the General Assembly, Davis made the following 
recommendation:  
“(F)or as long as there is no substantial progress towards the implementation of 
paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), UNRWA should not again 
attempt works projects designed to settle the refugees”(emphasis added).118 
He came to this conclusion by stating that previous efforts had been “virtually fruitless”, 
because resettlement was unacceptable to the host governments. Additionally, referring to 
the opposition towards resettlement he states that these “feelings of the Arab people run 
as deeply today as at any time in the past”.119 Still economic development was wanted, 
but in Davis’ eyes, not if it’s related to refugee resettlement. This marks a clear change in 
UNRWA’s policy of conducting its works programmes. 
New programmes have been introduced, such as the microfinance and microenterprise 
programme, which was established in 1991 and today operates in Gaza, West Bank, 
Jordan and Syria. In general it can be stated that UNRWA’s operations have become 
more diversified. In 1993 following the signing of the Declaration of Principles, the Peace 
Implementation Programme (PIP) was introduced. It contained a number of development 
projects, such as the construction of schools and health care centres, and was related to 
the supposed hand-over of competencies to the Palestinian authority in the framework of 
the peace process.120 Operations such as the RAO or the OSO programme, which will be 
explained later on, cover a multitude of tasks. Health care today addresses also 
psychological problems, new topics such as gender-mainstreaming have found its way 
into the agency’s policy, to name just a few more changes that took place. Many of them 
reflect a general change in the understanding of development assistance, and the 
introduction of certain principles into the world-wide discussion.  
It can be concluded there has been a major shift in the Agency’s functioning between 
1950 and today. While the original mandate focused on humanitarian relief, the Agency 
took the liberty to put its own emphasis on certain programmes and to introduce new 
ones. Especially the focus on education shows UNRWA’s early acknowledgement of the 
fact that the Palestine refugee problem and its own existence was likely to be a long-
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lasting situation. They understood the importance of this field for the future development 
of the refugee population. Education is one of the central and universally accepted 
instruments towards sustainable human development. The goal of education is to provide 
the students with the knowledge and the skills that will be necessary for including them 
into the economic life in any society. This is hoped to lead to a situation were future 
generations are less dependant on foreign assistance. Additionally, original efforts have 
been focused on technical assistance, therefore taking the role of a consultant. This 
attitude has also changed considerably. Today UNRWA stresses that it provides most of 
its services directly.  
 
4.2. Today's Development Work 
Education is UNRWA’s largest programme. It accounts for over 50 percent of the 
Agency’s budget and three quarters of its staff. In its five fields of operation UNRWA 
runs 668 elementary and preparatory schools, educating nearly half a million students. In 
the 1960 UNRWA achieved equal enrolment of boys and girls in its elementary schools, 
as the first in the region. Education also includes technical and vocational training, work 
placement and career guidance, measures that are aimed at improving the employability 
of Palestine refugees. 121 
For many years UNRWA’s budget has not met the increasing demands of the growing 
community of Palestine refugees, resulting in a range of new challenges to the 
programmes. Like in most programmes, the education programme is showing signs of a 
downward trend in quality. The teacher/student ratio is deteriorating and double-shifts in 
UNRWA schools are becoming normality. In 2006 circa 77 percent of UNRWA schools 
were operating on double-shifts. Double-shifting refers to a practice in which two 
consecutive streams of students attend the same facility in one day. Double-shifting often 
leads to shortened school days, puts pressure on facilities and staff and leads to lack of 
time for extracurricular activities.122 This phenomenon can only be addressed through the 
construction of more schools. In this context it has to be mentioned that in 2006 there 
were 46 Agency construction and infrastructure projects in Gaza and the West Bank that 
were delayed or stopped due to the restrictions by the Government of Israel on the 
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movement of construction material, vehicles and personnel into the OPT. These projects 
had an overall budget of US$ 16.9 million.123 
UNRWA remains the primary health care provider for Palestine refugees in the Near 
East.124 The health programme is UNRWA’s second largest area with 19 percent of its 
total general budget.125 UNRWA runs 127 clinics, where almost 9 million consultations 
take place every year. UNRWA’s health care system has made important achievements in 
its five fields of operation during the last six decades. The infant mortality rate dropped 
considerably from 160 per 1000 life births in the 1960s to 22 in 2006. Additionally they 
have provided the population with comprehensive vaccination, resulting in the fact that 
there have been no incidents of polio or tetanus in the agency’s area of operation. 126  
The challenges UNRWA faces in its health system include a rise among non-
communicable diseases like hypertension, diabetes and cancer and wide-spread anaemia 
in areas where there is an increase in poverty. In the OPT there are now twice as many 
refugees seeking help from UNRWA health care facilities than in 2000.127 This stands in 
relation to the stark increase in poverty since that year. Whereas 20 percent were living 
below the poverty line in 2000, this number has risen to 80 percent in 2007.128 The 
nutritional status of some refugees has shown signs that are worthy of concern. Incidences 
of low birth-weight of infants have doubled within one year (January and March of 2007 
compared to January 2006). Due to conflict situations in the OPT and Lebanon, post-
traumatic stress disorder and other psychological problems have increased sharply.129 As 
well as in the other programmes UNRWA is having difficulties due to budgetary 
constraints.  
Furthermore, ten percent of the budget is directed towards relief and social services, 
which focuses on 250,000 refugees who have been identified as so-called special hardship 
cases (SHC).130 
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The Microfinance and Microenterprise Programme is not financed from the general fund 
but provides its running cost from its credit operations. This programme was introduced 
in 1991 with the aim to help small business-owners, sustain jobs and reduce 
unemployment and poverty.131 
Prior to 2004 there was no coherent strategy for camp rehabilitation. In that year 
participants of the Geneva Conference urged UNRWA do develop comprehensive 
solutions for infrastructure and the housing situation in the camps. The Infrastructure and 
Camp Improvement Unit was established, studies were conducted on the need of the 
camps trying to include camp representatives and NGOs in the process.132 This meant 
also a more fundamental change in UNRWA’s involvement in infrastructure projects in 
the refugee camps, although it has to be stressed that UNRWA still does not administer 
these camps. Without this change it can be put into question if UNRWA had stepped up 
as the lead agency in the rebuilding of the Nahr el-bared refugee camp in the north of 
Lebanon, which was destroyed in 2007.  
 
4.3. Nahr El-Bared 
The reconstruction of Nahr el-Bared is a development project in the classical sense, 
including infrastructure and construction work. This undertaking manifests UNRWA as a 
development agency in the region. There is cooperation with the government of Lebanon 
and other UN and NGO actors, but UNRWA took the lead in the reconstruction efforts. 
Taking into account the already mentioned evolution from a policy of technical assistance 
in the early 1950s this can be regarded as clear opposite of that policy and expression of a 
fundamental change within UNRWA. It also stands for a new dimension of involvement 
by the agency into development issues concerning the Palestine refugee population. In 
June 2008 a donor conference took place in Vienna were costs of the reconstruction were 
presented and donors informed about the processes involved.133 
The Nahr el-Bared is a Palestinian refugee camp situated 16 kilometres north of Tripoli 
near the coastal road. From May to September 2007, a conflict took place between Fatah 
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al-Islam and the Lebanese army, which resulted in the total destruction of the camp. More 
than 30,000 people were displaced from the Nahr el-Bared Camp (NBC) and the area 
surrounding the camp.  
There are 31,303 registered refugees in Nahr El Bared camp but UNRWA estimates the 
numbers of those who actually lived in the camp before the events of 2007 at around 
27000.134 Among those refugees 8627 persons are registered as special hardship cases.  
The situation has started to escalate in February 2007, when two buses were bombed in 
Ain Alak, a predominantly Christian village near Bikfaya. Fatah al-Islam militants who 
were based in the camp were blamed. They were believed to have between 150-200 
armed men. The Lebanese military was banned from entering the camp under a 1969 
Arab accord.135 It is important to once again point out that UNRWA does not administer 
the camp and was therefore not responsible or capable or ensuring that there are no 
militant groups within the territory of the camp.136 Fighting started on 20 May 2007 first 
outside the camp, when militants began shooting at the Lebanese security forces after a 
police raid on a house used by Fatah al-Islam. Later the militants attacked a Lebanese 
military post at the gate of the camp and seized several vehicles. The Lebanese reacted by 
sending reinforcements, including heavy machinery, such as tanks. Thousands of refugees 
fled the camp, most of them found shelter in Baddawi camp, which is around 10 
kilometres away from Nahr al-Bared – a situation that is still ongoing today (September 
2008). UNRWA and Lebanese officials emphasized that the militant group does not 
represent the Palestine refugees in the camp, and that the refugees became innocent 
victims caught in the middle of the fighting. Also refugees at Baddawi camp showed 
support towards the Lebanese Army and its attack against Fatah Al-Islam.137  
Reconstruction of the camp is supposed to also lead to more general improvements of the 
political and social situation within the camp. The Government of Lebanon states in its 
report about the reconstruction of Nahr al-Bared camp: 
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“(...) the camp will not return to the previous environmental, social and political 
status quo that facilitated its takeover by terrorists. This reconstruction process is 
understood as an opportunity to improve both the camp and its environment.”138 
According to the Government of Lebanon, “UNRWA is the lead agency for the provision 
of housing and basic socio-economic services to the refugee population in the Nahr el-
Bared and Beddawi Camps. (…) It will continue to be the lead agency on the provision 
for Relief throughout the completion of the recovery process in and around NBC.”139 
UNRWA extends its relief efforts also to the population surrounding the camp. 
Efforts have been made to improve coordination between NGOs and UN organizations. 
The UN formed a cluster system to centralize information, identify gaps in response and 
avoid duplication of activities within various sectors.140  
The Nahr el-Bared Reconstruction Commission for Civil Action and Studies (NBRC) and 
UNRWA’s Infrastructure and Camp Improvement Programme have jointly developed the 
Preliminary Master Plan for the reconstruction of the camp. There are reconstruction 
guidelines that have been developed in cooperation with the refugee community to reflect 
their needs and aspirations. Interviews were conducted by the NBRC starting in July 
2007.141 
Due to the territorial restrictions of Nahr el-Bared refugee camp, and population increase 
the living situation of most of the inhabitants of the camp was difficult. Many of the 
families resided in housing that could be described as sub-standard. Water supply as well 
as the sewage system was inadequate. UNRWA and other actors involved have made it 
their aspiration to systematically improve living conditions in the newly constructed 
camp.142 
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The following seven guidelines have been developed:143 
1. Extended family building type: Extended families will be living in the same building, 
in keeping with traditional Arab housing patterns. According to the UNRWA Master 
Plan this encourages strong family support mechanisms. 
2. Recreating the old neighbourhoods: New housing blocks will be arranged similar to 
the way they were before the conflict. This shall enhance social cohesion.  
3. Replicating the camp’s landmarks: Mosques, kindergartens and other public landmarks 
will be rebuilt in their original location in order to enhance the sense of identity and to 
encourage acceptance of the new camp design among the refugee community.  
4. Building better housing: New buildings will have stronger foundations in order to 
support up to four stories. This shall prevent overcrowding in the camp. Previously 
sub-standard housing will be rebuilt according to a minimum acceptable standard 
adopted by UNRWA. 
5. Improving the camps environment: A higher percentage of the territory shall be 
reserved as public space in order to improve natural light, airflow and access. 
Courtyards within the compounds are planned in order to create semi-public spaces 
and to provide light to the back rooms of the buildings. 
6. Improving the infrastructure: This will include water and sewerage networks, street 
lighting and storm water drainage channels. 
7. Improving access: Finally, wider roads, more parking space and more pedestrian 
walkways shall provide the camp with better access including for emergency services. 
Road congestion shall be reduced. 
According to UNRWA sustainability and governance of the future camp depend on a 
number of factors that still have to be addressed. UNRWA emphasises the importance of 
better coordination of all stakeholders involved.144 By doing so it implicitly states that 
UNRWA will not be the major addressee for complaints regarding issues relating to 
questions of sustainability and governance. These include future ownership of the new 
buildings, regulation of future urban growth, inclusive and community-based 
management structures, the sustainability of the camp’s utility running costs (electricity, 
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telecommunications), good waste management and other measures that will address 
security concerns of the refugee population as well as the Government of Lebanon.145 
This comprehensive approach, again, reflects the change that took place within UNRWA: 
from a consultancy role in the 1950s to an active player who does not shy away from 
being perceived as a major development actor in the region.  
 
4.4. Assessment of UNRWA’s Work towards Development 
UNRWA’s annual report 2007 contains the following description of UNRWA’s purpose: 
“The purpose of UNRWA is to contribute to the human development of Palestine 
refugees in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic 
until a just solution is found to the refugee issue.” It further reads “The Agency fulfils this 
purpose by providing a variety of essential services within the framework of international 
standards.”146  
Despite extensive research on this topic including personal inquiry with UNRWA, the 
author could not establish which international standards the commissioner-general was 
referring to. As of the author’s knowledge no official guidelines exist concerning 
UNRWA’s performance in development. While the wording indicated UNRWA’s 
willingness to adhere to international standards, this happens on a rather voluntary basis, 
because the agency is in many respects isolated from the broader UN regime. The fact 
that it did not become member of the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) is the 
expression of this fact.147 The UNDG adhered collectively to the Paris Declaration for 
Aid Effectiveness, which creates monitoring and evaluation measures, which in the 
author’s view are appropriate for UNRWA as well. The Paris Declaration is a world-wide 
effort to improve the quality of development assistance. The fact that UNRWA is not part 
of this development further perpetuates its isolation. According to Commissioner-General 
Karen AbuZayd one of the benefits of the organisational development and the improved 
management capacity would be the ability to “explain its (the agency’s) work to the rest 
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of the world.”148 The need to explain UNRWA’s work originates from this isolation, and 
could be diminished by the engagement in world-wide initiatives. The advantages would 
be more international visibility and more awareness about UNRWA’s mandate and work. 
By adhering to the Paris Declaration countries or organisations agree to 56 partnership 
commitments and 12 indicators of progress. They also pledge to monitor and assess their 
progress in the light of agreed targets that were set for 2010.149 One of the major 
messages that came from the Paris Conference in 2005 was that “Development assistance 
works best when it is fully aligned with national priorities and needs”.150 The Paris 
Declaration is part of the broader Millennium Development goals (MDG) movement, 
which was initiated following the passing of the Millennium Development Declaration in 
September 2000, and was part of the preparations of the international community for the 
review of both the Millennium Declaration and the MDGs.151 According to the Action 
Plan towards the Implementation of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness by the 
UN Development Group the Paris Declaration has “major implications for the work of the 
UNDG and UN country teams (...)”.152 The UNDG has defined three points as central to 
achieving the Paris commitments: “1. putting national development plans at the center of 
UN country programming, 2. strengthening national capacities, 3. increasingly using and 
strengthening national systems.”  
UNRWA was established in a unique historical setting, and is therefore different from 
most other development agencies – including its relation to the countries where it 
operates. Therefore, the above three indicators will have to be addressed in a different 
manner. Yet, serious commitment and monitoring in the light of these guidelines, in 
accordance to UNRWA’s capabilities, would provide the agency with more credibility. In 
addition some of UNRWA’s special characteristics can be compared to development 
efforts in fragile states, which is mentioned in the Paris Declaration (par. 37-39) and as 
discussed by the OECD.153 
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Despite this lack of guidelines and transparency UNRWA’s performance in development 
seems to be good. The UNRWA director of health stated the following in his report to the 
World Health Assembly in 2008:  
“UNRWA is the largest humanitarian operation in the region, providing assistance 
to almost half the population of the occupied Palestinian territory. Despite the 
increasingly unstable operational environment, it continues to provide one of the 
most cost-effective and efficient health systems in the region.”154 
Rex Brynen sees UNRWA’s general performance in a rather positive light as well: 
“After 50 years of refugeehood, minor differentials exist between the living 
conditions of the Palestinian refugee population and their neighbours in the host 
countries. This means that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the international community and 
the governments of the host countries have provided adequate assistance to cover 
their basic socioeconomic needs. Compared to other Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) countries, living condition indicators compare well.”155 
UNRWA’s work is hampered by serious gaps in funding. While the refugee population is 
ever-increasing, budget did not keep up with this challenge. Therefore austerity measures 
are being introduced, which are felt by the refugees. UNRWA effectively competes for 
budget with the UNHCR and the Red Cross.156 Already in 1997 Charles Petrie, the then 
Special Assistant to the Commissioner-General stated, "we often hear complaints in the 
camps that people feel abandoned by the international community as they perceive 
services cut and a decrease in Agency activity."157  
UNRWA’s financial situation has always been difficult. Even though its regular budget 
has increased considerably during the last decades, this increase could not keep pace with 
the increasing needs of a fast-growing refugee population.  
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At a New York press conference in November 2007 UNRWA Commissioner-General 
Karen Koning AbuZayd said that without significantly more resources, UNRWA would 
not be able to continue its work and deliver the quality of basic services that refugees 
were entitled to.158 
 
4.5. Criticism  
This chapter will present some of the criticism UNRWA is faced with. Criticism includes 
many different aspects. These can only be scratched upon within the framework of this 
thesis, knowing that a more profound discussion of all points of concern is needed in 
order to come to a final conclusion on the value of the criticism. In addition to the 
presentation of the concerns, counterarguments will be presented without fully dismissing 
the criticism, but leaving room for own reflection. The author still judges this chapter as 
important for the discussion of the topic, because it provides the reader with an 
understanding of the controversy about UNRWA.  
Although not all of the points focus on UNRWA’s performance in development, many of 
the arguments are indirectly part of the broader development discourse. Accusations to be 
biased, to create dependency or the perpetuation of the refugee situation, problems with 
efficiency and high overhead costs are of concern to most development agencies. 
Therefore, the discussion of these can be found in the present chapter on UNRWA’s role 
in development. 
From the beginning UNRWA has had to confront criticism from different sides. Some 
very strong opposition came from Arab countries and the refugee population itself. The 
Agency came into being right after a large scale war in the region. Suspicion ran high also 
towards the United Nations which was partly made responsible for the refugee problem. 
This can be seen in a remark by the Director of UNRWA in 1950 referring to a visit to 
Arab countries in the region:  
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“A cordial reception was accorded the Agency in all capitals, though it was 
evident that its motives and possibilities were generally not clearly appreciated 
and in some instances were even under suspicion.”159 
The Agency was under suspicion also from the side of Palestine refugees themselves. 
Right after the start of UNRWA operations in 1950 “camps involving some 30,000 relief 
recipients (roughly 3 per cent of the total) called food strikes on the pretext that the 
Agency was a tool of capitalist governments, but well before the end of the month all of 
the refugees settled down and accepted their rations at the normal distribution period.”160 
The Arab press engaged in a campaign of harsh criticism of the Agency in August 1950. 
In Lebanon and Syria UNRWA workers were threatened and hindered to fulfil their 
duties. In Syria the UNRWA office in Damascus was destroyed by explosives and a 
bomb was thrown at a truck load of UNRWA workers.161 
The initial perception of the conflict and of UNRWA by the Palestinian refugee 
community was also described in the first interim report by the Director of UNRWA in 
1950. 
„It is (…) a fact that the refugee, individually and collectively, is tired of his 
present condition. Above all, he wishes to return to his former home and means of 
livelihood. He has been repeatedly told, and generally believes, that his present 
condition is due to the interference of the Western world in his affairs. He is 
resentful of the fact that he is forced to live away from his former home and that 
he has received no compensation for his losses. He is also resentful of the fact that 
his money in banks in Israel is withheld from him. He considers the United 
Nations mainly responsible for his plight. He expresses little, if any, gratitude for 
the Agency's efforts to maintain or improve his condition.”162 
UNRWA is accused of increasing dependency of Palestine refugees. While services are 
important for many refugees, under normal circumstances only 5.7 percent of the refugees 
receive food aid or other direct assistance.163 Since its main activities are education and 
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health care services it is difficult to argue that dependence is increased. On the contrary 
one could argue that the Agency’s services enable people to become more self-sufficient.  
Giorgio Giacomelli, confronted with this criticism, took position in UNRWA’s annual 
report 1987. 
“There have also been misconceptions about the kind of assistance the Agency 
provides under, its mandate. Initially, the Agency provided the refugees with 
emergency relief assistance such as food, clothing and shelter. With the passage of 
time, however, the needs of the refugees changed and the Agency adapted its 
services to meet, those changing needs. Today, it (…) devotes the bulk of its 
efforts and resources to the productive developmental tasks of educating children, 
furnishing advanced training, maintaining an effective public health care service 
and providing a basic welfare service to a population (...) that is largely 
industrious and self-supporting. Yet, in some quarters, UNRWA continues to be 
portrayed as an Agency concerned with distributing food to refugees who sit idly 
in camps, relieved of the need to earn a living. Such a portrayal is grossly unfair 
both to the Agency and to the refugees.”164 
According to Benjamin Schiff, “attacks against UNRWA come in three varieties. First, 
critics charge that UNRWA inappropriately aids one or the other side. Second, they assert 
that it is inefficient and ineffective. Third, they charge that the agency’s operations and its 
very existence undermine the possibilities for positive change by entrenching an 
undesirable status quo.”165 
The following statement further illuminates the difficulties UNRWA faces in the OPT. 
“While Israelis charge that UNRWA allows Palestinians to use the agency for 
their purposes, Palestinians charge that it sometimes cooperates too much with the 
occupation.”166 
Anachronistic training programmes had been detected in the 1990. For example in 1997, 
the Agency still offered training courses on the repair of manual type writers.167  
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“Most of the criticism concerns the UNRWA showing the pathology of aging, 
including symptoms of inflexibility, resistance to adjust to the changing political 
environment and refusal to phase out and transfer its responsibilities to the 
Palestinian Authority.”168 
Today it is safe to say that “the pathology of aging” is no longer an issue. The 
comprehensive management reform introduced following the Geneva Conference in 2004 
led to an agency-wide reassessment of operations and addresses its shortcomings in a 
convincing way.169 
Although agency officials stress that UNRWA is only in place as long as it is needed, due 
to the lack of a just solution, the lack of a concrete strategy about how the agency would 
be withdrawn in the region, leads to doubts about this statement. In favour of UNRWA 
one could argue that solution of the problem seems distant and UNRWA is therefore 
more concerned about the imminent needs of the refugees under its mandate. In addition, 
when the conflict was seen in a more hopeful way, in the beginning of the Oslo Peace 
Process, the Agency took measures to prepare for its withdrawal. In the annual report 
1993/1994 the Commissioner-General makes the following statement: 
“The historic developments that took place during the year under review - 1 July 
1993 to 30 June 1994 - had a profound impact on the work and responsibilities of 
the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near 
East (UNRWA). With the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza 
Strip and the Jericho area and the anticipated extension of self-rule to the rest of 
the West Bank, UNRWA entered a new era in its relationship with the Palestinian 
people. Thenceforth, in addition to maintaining the services that it had provided 
for over 40 years, the Agency would soon begin a process of preparing for the 
eventual hand-over of its installations, services and programmes to the 
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.”170 
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Also UNRWA is aware of this problematic situation. According to Olof Rydbeck, 
Commissioner- General of UNRWA between 1979 and 1985, “Either dissolving 
UNRWA or making it permanent would be an admission by the United Nations that there 
was no solution to the Middle East struggle. That leaves us with a permanently jerry-built 
structure to keep the fiction alive.”171 
UNRWA is accused of teaching hatred of Israel in its text books. In the OPT UNRWA 
used Egyptian and Jordanian text books in Gaza and the West Bank respectively. Only 
after 1994 the Palestinian Authority started to replace the text books with new ones. On 
its website UNRWA cites studies that have been conducted showing that “the new books 
have removed the anti-Semitism present in the older books”, that they “must be seen as a 
tremendous improvement” and that they don’t compare unfavourably compared to Israeli 
text books.172 
High overhead cost is a problem of many international organizations and other actors 
engaged in humanitarian or development work. UNHCR, urged by donors, had to 
introduce an extensive internal reform in order to reduce its costs in headquarters and on 
staff in general.173 Of UNRWA’s biennial budget 2008/2009 of US$ 1,093,252,000, staff 
cost amounts to US$ 773,269,000. This constitutes about 70 % of the total budget.174 Still 
the two organisations function in a different way and UNRWA’s internal structure is 
somewhat special. Therefore, change of policy is not to be expected. UNRWA’s role as 
an employer should also not be underestimated, with 13,922 staff in the OPT.175 The 
number of international staff has been reduced – but not the number of general staff.176 
This indicates that there is consent for this practice. In contrast to UNHCR and UNICEF 
it provides its services directly, therefore employing a much higher number of persons. 
Therefore a direct comparison to either of these organizations does not lead to the 
seemingly obvious conclusion that UNRWA’s bureaucracy is less efficient. The question 
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whether it is reasonable to employ that many people or if it would be more desirable to 
delegate operations to local NGOs or other actors is a different one, but as it stands the 
high overhead costs of the agency result to a great extent from the way UNRWA is 
organised and does not necessarily indicate inefficiencies.  
In 1989, Benjamin Schiff had the following to say in regard of accusations that the 
agency was inefficient and ineffective:  
“Good scores on the tawjihi exams and falling disease and mortality rates imply 
that UNRWA is effective, even if its efficiency can be questioned. Its lack of 
funding for maintenance and construction, and consequently poor facilities serving 
large numbers of clients seem to indicate that it is in fact stretching its finances 
quite far. UNRWA is a labor-intensive organization, because health and education 
are labor-intensive activities. The majority of its employees are teachers, and 
average class sizes are large. The inefficiency claim is very unlikely.”177 
The perpetuation of the refugee problem is an issue that is frequently raised in relation to 
UNRWA’s work.178 Some authors suggest that if UNRWA was to dissolve the 
Palestinian Authority as well as Israel and the Arab host countries would have to take up 
responsibility for the well-being of the refugees and would be forced to enhance efforts 
towards a durable solution. While it is difficult to forecast the effects of a withdrawal of 
the agency, one could see the issue from a different perspective. UNRWA is a product of 
the international community established and maintained in order to reduce the negative 
effects of the long-lasting refugee problem. Therefore it lies not in UNRWA’s 
responsibility to “force” the actors involved to engage in efforts towards a just solution, 
but it is the responsibility of the states to take those steps and to encourage a 
disengagement of UNRWA when this is feasible.  
Commissioner-General of UNRWA, Giorgio Giacomelli, complained about a wide-
spread misconception of UNRWA’s mandate in his annual report presented to the 
General Assembly in 1987. 
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“UNRWA was set up to provide assistance to the Palestine refugees pending the 
implementation of the solution agreed upon by the General Assembly. It was not 
given the responsibility of implementing that solution; that task was given to a 
political body of the United Nations system, the United Nations Conciliation, 
Commission for Palestine. (…) Unfortunately, outside United Nations circles, this 
tends to have been forgotten. The result has been that UNRWA has been attacked 
for not seeking durable solution and has been accused of perpetuating the 
problem.”179 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
We have seen in this chapter that considerable adaptations have taken place in the course 
of time. The works projects were tried to be installed in the very beginning of the 
Agency’s existence, though shortly after it was decided that they were not welcomed by 
the refugees or the host governments. The shift towards education has been the first major 
change in the agency’s programmes now aimed at a more sustainable development in the 
region. This resulted from the realization in the early 1950s that a durable solution to the 
refugee problem might not be imminent and that if it wasn’t for UNRWA, no other actor 
in the field wanted to take on the tasks of education and health care. This change has 
continued over the decades, including the introduction of new programmes, such as 
microfinance and initiatives in the framework of the Peace Implementation Programme. 
This resulted in today’s situation where 90% of UNRWA's budget is used for projects that 
can be labelled development projects, and only 10% go towards relief services, which 
according the 1950’s understanding of the term development do not fall in this category.  
The reasons for this change happened mostly passively within UNRWA as a reaction to 
the realities on the ground. Examples have shown that UNRWA was sometimes even 
reluctant to take on new tasks, but resolutions by the General Assembly many times 
welcomed an extended engagement of the Agency in the region – also in development 
projects. 
The example of the planned reconstruction of the Nahr el-Bared Camp in northern 
Lebanon has shown today’s criteria and principles in a classical development/construction 
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project, and is a milestone in UNRWA’s engagement in infrastructure and camp 
development. 
In the author’s eyes it would be helpful if UNRWA were part of the United Nations 
Development Group, and consequently also party to the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness, which includes indicators in order to evaluate development projects 
according to standardized principles.  
UNRWA faces criticism concerning a great number of issues. Whereas some of this 
criticism is unfounded and based on negligence of some basic facts, others, especially the 
ones concerning management and efficiency issues, have to be taken seriously. An all-
embracing management reform has been introduced within the Agency following 
UNRWA’s high level conference in Geneva in 2004. Outcomes are already visible and 
more improvement is being promised.180 Another set of criticism addresses UNRWA’s 
existence in itself. In this respect responsibility of UNRWA is limited in its function as a 
subsidiary and non-political organ of the United Nations.  
5. UNRWA’s Role in the Protection of Refugees 
 
Refugees are a particularly vulnerable group and deserve international protection. One of 
the defining characteristics of refugees is that the country of origin doesn’t provide for 
their protection, or they might be stateless persons, and therefore don’t have a national 
authority they could turn to as a citizen. And even though article 26 of the International 
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights states that all persons are entitled without any 
discrimination to the equal protection of the law, Palestinian refugees make up a group 
that is singled out and consequently doesn’t benefit from the international protection 
regime.181 This fact results in a de jure and a de facto protection gap.182 The reasons for 
and the consequences of this phenomenon and the role UNRWA plays or could 
potentially play will be subject of this chapter.  
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5.1. What is Protection? 
 
5.1.1. The United Nations and Human Rights 
One of the fundamental aims of the whole United Nations system is the promotion of 
human rights on a global level.183 The normative and institutional development of the 
international protection of human rights can be divided in three different phases.184 The 
first phase was mainly concerned with standard-setting, the search for binding norms and 
codification. It started with the coming into power of the charter of the United Nations 
and finished with the adoption of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1966.185 
Codification continues until today, but during this first phase the most comprehensive and 
groundbreaking work has been done.186 The second phase began around 1965 and 
focused on the promotion of these rights. International mechanisms were created to 
enable individuals and groups to pursue claims based on the violation of fundamental 
human rights. With the end of the Cold War a new phase started, which is still ongoing.187 
During this phase the actors involved are striving to make the monitoring mechanisms 
more effective. The western democratic model has been adopted as the most apt to 
promote human rights, therefore relieving the discourse of the burden of sometimes 
contradicting east-west ideologies. The connection between western democracy and 
human rights had already been agreed upon by the Commission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE; since 1995 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, OSCE) in 1990.188 The Council of Europe and the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (also called the European Convention on 
Human Rights, ECHR) have been setting the standards for Europe. Human rights have 
been made an issue of international interest. They found their way into arguments of 
international peace and security. The development of individual accountability before 
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international criminal courts concerning genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes is also an expression of this trend.189 UNRWA’s annual reports mention human 
rights for the first time in 1968.190 In 2000 UNRWA started to teach conflict resolution 
and basic human rights in its schools.191 In the latest annual reports of 2006 and 2007 
human rights have been mentioned in the introduction pointing out that States and the 
international community are the ones responsible for the protection of refugees.192 
UNRWA, being a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, is in itself bound by the United 
Nations Charter provisions and accordingly, “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human 
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and 
women and of nations large and small” as stated in the Preamble. In addition, it is not 
unaffected by the developments and changes in trend that occurred during the last 60 
decades. One should keep in mind this bigger picture when discussing the reasons for 
UNRWA’s efforts towards the protection of human rights.  
 
5.1.2. Definition of the Term Protection 
There are different forms of protection. As a first step one can distinguish between the 
Protection of individuals in general, which means “securing the enjoyment of basic rights 
that are inherent to every human being”193 and International Protection. The latter is 
based on international law as opposed to protection provided under the national law of 
states. Furthermore, Parvathaneni talks about “a variety of protection contexts”, which 
include diplomatic protection, consular protection, protection under humanitarian law, 
protection under human rights law, protection of the vulnerable (children women, elderly, 
disabled, etc.), and protection of refugees and stateless persons.194 The first two 
categories, diplomatic and consular protection, are not relevant for refugees because they 
represent rights of states,195 and refugees per definition do not enjoy protection by their 
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states of nationality, or do not belong to any nationality – as is the case of the majority of 
Palestinian refugees.196 International refugee protection first became an issue during the 
time of the League of Nations197 and evolved historically as a compensation for the lack 
of access to consular and diplomatic protection by refugees. Today refugee protection is 
part of the broader international human rights regime.198 Because of the fact that refugees, 
unlike other foreigners, cannot turn to the authorities of their home countries, they must 
seek protection from the international community.199  
There are different definitions of the word “protection” – a stricter one, which basically 
means legal protection as opposed to broader ones as presented for example by the 
Secretary-General.200 Therefore, when using this term in any kind of publication, it would 
be necessary to explain what is meant by the author(s). But even in official UN 
resolutions the term is not defined and leaves room for interpretation. Although scholars 
agree that UNRWA does not have an explicit protection mandate,201 which could be 
compared to the one of UNHCR the term comes up in the resolution that is passed every 
three years to prolong the mandate without being defined. 
According to the UNHCR its protection function includes promoting international 
agreements for refugee protection, supervising their application, assisting governments 
and private actors in the voluntary repatriation of refugees or in their resettlement in third 
countries, and assisting refugees in protecting their properties, such as restitution or 
transfer of assets left in their states of origin.202 One can divide UNHCR’s protection role 
into two main blocks: one is the direct protection of the refugees’ human right, and the 
other is the search for and the implementation of durable solutions.203 Since its inception 
UNHCR’s role in protection has evolved significantly.204 Is has expanded its mandate to 
include persons who do not fit the convention’s strict statutory definition, such as 
displaced persons, returnees, and persons falling within broader refugee definitions 
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adopted by individual states. 205 UNHCR’s mandate can serve as an example for the 
successful transformation of the mandate and adaption to changed realities. This 
evolution has been supported by the international community.206 Refugees also benefit 
from a broader concept of human rights inscribed in a multitude of human rights 
instruments.207  
In its Interim Programme Strategy 2008-2009 UNRWA defines protection in the 
following terms: 
“In line with the definition of the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee, we 
understand protection to encompass activities that are geared towards obtaining 
full respect for the rights of refugees under relevant international law.”208 
A citation from the first page of the UNRWA’s annual report 2007 shows that, indeed, 
the agency states protection as one of its priorities. 
 “UNRWA is a global advocate for the protection and care of Palestine refugees. 
In circumstances of humanitarian crisis and armed conflict, the Agency’s 
emergency interventions, and indeed its presence, serve as tangible symbols of the 
international community’s concern and ultimately contributes to a stable 
environment.”209 
At the same time this excerpt reveals the still unclear definition UNRWA uses for this 
concept. It uses protection and care in the same sentence, making it difficult for the 
reader to get a clear picture of what is meant with either of these terms. Are the Agency’s 
emergency interventions part of its protection efforts? Is its presence – the “symbol of the 
international community’s concern” – part of the agency’s understanding of protection?  
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The agency is aware of this lack of clarity and is working on a clear strategy: 
“Our ongoing work on developing a protection strategy will focus on clarifying 
the actions, rights and legal precepts that are germane to UNRWA’s mandate and 
to our specific operational context and the needs of each field.”210 
Furthermore, in UNRWA’s Interim Programme Strategy 2008-2009, human rights are 
seen as part of human development.211 This could be interpreted to mean that the issue of 
human rights is indirectly part of UNRWA’s daily work, considering that UNRWA’s 
over-all mission reads: “To help Palestine refugees achieve their full potential in human 
development terms under the difficult circumstances in which they live”.212  
In a report to the Security Council in 1988 the then Secretary-General defined four 
different concepts of the term protection in connection to the first intifada in the OPT. 
Firstly, protection can mean physical protection through armed forces, who might engage 
in fights in reaction to threats to the safety of the protected persons. Secondly, protection 
can mean legal protection. Thirdly, protection can mean general assistance, “in which an 
outside agency intervenes with the authorities of the occupying power to help individuals 
or groups of individuals to resist violations of their rights”.213 And finally, in can mean 
protection by outside agencies, especially media, who protect through their mere presence 
in combination with the knowledge of the occupier that violations might be published. 
The Secretary-General had to admit that this last notion of protection was very difficult to 
determine. 
In the context of this thesis the first category is not of importance because UNRWA does 
not engage in such physical protection and does not have the capabilities to do so. Legal 
protection as well as the engagement with the authorities will be discussed. The fourth 
aspect might concern UNRWA as well, but due to the fact that this is just a well-received 
side-effect of UNRWA’s work as well as the difficulties in measuring this form of 
protection it will not be discussed in this paper, and consequently will not be included in 
the definition of the term protection for this work.  
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The author agrees with the statement by Arthur Helton: “when we speak of “protection”, 
we mean legal protection”.214 She will, therefore, not focus on physical protection as well 
as protection through indirect effects caused by mere presence of UNRWA personnel. 
Nonetheless, the term legal protection will be used in a broader sense including 
consultations with government authorities and what we might generally describe as 
advocacy role of an organization. To put it in a nutshell, the term protection in this paper 
can be understood as legal protection plus advocacy work, whereas advocacy includes 
engagement with authorities as well as all forms of publications that address Palestinian 
rights and/or protection gaps. 
 
5.1.3. Temporary Protection 
As we have seen, the search for durable solution and the immediate protection of human 
rights both are considered efforts towards protection of a certain group. This paper will 
mostly focus on immediate protection solutions. During the last 60 years the plight of the 
Palestine refugees has been merged with the broader political conflict, thus compromising 
basic human rights and holding them in a limbo situation. The obvious answer to their 
suffering would be a just solution of the conflict including the right to chose between 
different options (return or get compensation in case of resettlement). Yet, this solution 
seems now “more remote than ever”,215 which could lead to a stronger focus on the 
immediate needs and protection gaps of the Palestine refugees. According to Susan 
Akram, in a state of temporary protection Palestinians in host countries would enjoy 
many of the rights of an individual granted asylum, but would lack the permanent status 
that might compromise their right to return to their home country.216 Temporary 
protection would be tied to this right to return as well as to refugee choice as described 
earlier. There are a couple of advantages and disadvantages for the states and the refugees 
respectively. The individual might be afforded fewer rights than a refugee under the 1951 
Convention, but it is still the grant of a set of certain basic rights, such as the right to work 
and the right to freedom of movement. For the states it is an alternative to the obligation 
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to provide full asylum procedures, which would otherwise be required, therefore making 
it easier for the states to admit to this measure. This is due mainly to the stressing of the 
fact that the situation is a temporary one and that the State will not be expected to fully 
integrate the refugee group.  
 
5.2. Palestine Refugees in International Law 
5.2.1. Reasons for a Special Regime for Palestinian Refugees 
Article 1D of the 1951 Refugee Convention 
First sentence: 
“This Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present receiving from 
organs or agencies of the United Nations other than The United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance.”217 
This article is generally referred to as exclusion clause.218  
Special attention should be paid to the wording “who receive protection or assistance”. 
The word “or” is of crucial importance. One could argue that only one of the conditions 
has to be fulfilled in order to exclude the person concerned. It should be noted that during 
the drafting process the parties were not aware of the protection gap they were creating, 
and this gap was not indented by the parties concerned.219 This argument will be 
discussed later on, taking into account the travaux préparatoires of the convention.220 
Only one non-governmental organization with consultative status, the Commission of the 
Churches on International Affairs, suggested changing the wording into “who receive 
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assistance and protection”, because “material assistance is not in itself a guarantee of 
protection”.221  
According to a statement issued by UNHCR in 2002 concerning interpretation of Art 1D 
of the 1951 Convention the deciding factor to fall under the first sentence is weather the 
person is inside of UNRWA’s area of operation and is registered or eligible to be 
registered with UNRWA. In a UNHCR paper on the applicability of Art 1d it is stated 
that the intent of this article was to “avoid (...) overlapping competencies”.222  
Second sentence: 
“When such protection or assistance has ceased for any reason, without the 
position of such persons being definitely settled in accordance with the relevant 
resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, these persons 
shall ipso facto be entitled to the benefits of this Convention.” 
This article is generally referred to as an inclusion clause.223 This clause is interpreted to 
mean a general and automatic inclusion of Palestine refugees in the case protection 
ceases. This would have as a consequence that Palestine refugees who no longer receive 
assistance from UNRWA would not need to prove that they fall under the definition of a 
refugee as stated in art. 1A of the 1951 Refugee Convention but countries should treat 
them as refugees automatically. This however has not been the case in many countries, 
also due to incorrect interpretations by the UNHCR.224  
Many scholars stress that the motive for singling out the Palestinian refugees was not 
meant to exclude them from the protection mechanisms, which where established to 
ensure the rights of refugees worldwide – but due to the belief that this group of refugees 
deserved special measures.225 This becomes clear when taking into account the very 
extensive discussions around the issue of Palestine refugees during the drafting of the 
UNHCR Statute. The situation was thought to be of high importance and to deserve a 
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special regime in order not to be “submerged (...) and relegated to a position of minor 
importance.”226 One of the reasons why this case deserved special attention was the heavy 
responsibility the UN itself bore for the plight of this particular group of refugees, due to 
the partition plan and the recognition of the State of Israel. During discussions in Geneva 
an amendment was introduced by Egypt, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, which aimed at 
distinguishing the Palestine refugees as a group from other refugees. According to the 
Lebanese representative this was necessary because usually refugee problems come into 
life through the breach of international law as set forth by the United Nations, whereas in 
the Palestinian case “the existence of the Palestine refugees (...) was the direct result of a 
decision taken by the United Nations itself, with full knowledge of the consequences.”227  
The situation is also unique because “the obstacle to their repatriation was not 
dissatisfaction with their homeland, but the fact that a Member of the United Nations was 
preventing their return.”228 UNHCR offers three main durable solutions to a refugee 
problem: repatriation, host country absorption, and third-state resettlement – two of which 
are being rejected by Palestinians and host countries respectively, and one of which 
(repatriation) is denied by Israel. This lack of opportunities for a durable solution is one 
of the basic characteristics of the Palestine refugee problem. 
Article 1D was also included to free the Arab host countries from responsibility for this 
group of refugees. Yet, the Arab states never became party to these instruments, therefore 
article 1D has never been applied for the reasons it was intended.229 Even in other states 
article 1D was hardly ever applied for the first 15 years after its creation. Only through 
the 1967 war and regional conflict and unrest, which resulted in many refugees being 
displaced for a second time, there were a great number of Palestine refugees, who asked 
for the determination of refugee status under the 1951 Convention. Parties to the 
Convention for the first time had to decide how to apply article 1D, and if it was 
applicable to Palestine refugees who had left UNRWA’s area of operation. Practice of 
states differed considerably regarding this issue.230 And once countries had decided that 
the first sentence of 1D did not apply, practice also differed concerning the second 
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sentence regarding the automatic inclusion of Palestine refugees as a group. Consequently 
in some states Palestine refugees then had to prove that they fall under article 1A(1) i.e. 
that they fled a country due to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. Only in 
2002 UNHCR issued a paper addressing the interpretation of article 1D and stating that 
Palestine refugees who no longer reside in UNRWA’s area of operation should fall under 
the second sentence of article 1D and therefore automatically be considered refugees who 
deserve protection under the 1951 Convention.231  
Since the UNCCP has not contributed to the protection of Palestine refugees in decades232 
one might argue that protection for Palestinian refugees has ceased. One conclusion could 
be to argue that therefore all Palestinian refugees should now be considered refugees 
under the 1951 Refugee Convention. Authors like Farah, Akram and Goodwin-Gill agree 
to this argument.233 Although from the legal perspective it might be a reasonable 
argument, in practice it is an opinion that’s not very wide-spread and UNHCR is likely to 
be opposed to this interpretation. 
As seen above all three main solutions offered by UNHCR still seem impossible to 
implement in the Palestinian case. Therefore Palestine refugees have lived in “temporary” 
arrangements for 60 years now. The reason for this is that the UN merged the issue of 
protection with the larger conflict. As Rempel puts it “in the midst of all the other 
outstanding issues on the agenda the rights of the refugees were, in effect, displaced in the 
search for a resolution of the entire conflict itself.”234 A report by the UN Economic 
Survey Mission of the Middle East made two important statements: First, “The refugees 
themselves are the most serious manifestation of “economic dislocation” created by the 
Arab-Israeli hostilities. And second, “The continuing political stalemate in the relations 
between the Arab countries and Israel precludes any early solution of the refugee problem 
by means of repatriation or large-scale resettlement.”235 
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Yet, although a durable solution has to be found in the future the immediate protection 
needs of Palestine refugees have to be addressed irrespective of the political situation and 
efforts have to be increased in order to implement the basic human rights to which every 
person is entitled. 
 
5.2.2. The Applicability of Human Rights in the OPT  
The West Bank remains occupied territory and is therefore also subject to international 
humanitarian law. This opinion has also been confirmed by the International Court of 
Justice in its advisory opinion of 2004.236 
Since the withdrawal of the permanent IDF forces from Gaza accompanied by the 
evacuation of Israeli settlements from Gaza in 2005, there has been ongoing discussion 
about the status of Gaza. Prime Minister Sharon had declared that with the withdrawal 
Israeli responsibility for the entire Gaza strip had ceased.237 Yet, this opinion is highly 
contested among others by the United Nations,238 who are especially referring to the 
concept of effective control over the territory.239 The concept of effective control contains 
the notion that the presence or absence of permanent military forces in a territory is not 
the deciding factor for determining whether this territory is under occupation or not. In 
the case of Gaza John Dugard, the Special Rapporteur on the situation in the OPT to the 
UN Human Rights Council,240 suggests four factors that demonstrate Israel’s effective 
control over Gaza. First, he names substantial control over Gaza’s six land crossings.241 
Control through military incursions, rocket attacks and sonic bombs is the second 
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deciding factor. According to Dugard within the territory of the Gaza strip there are so 
called “no-go” zones, where Palestinians are not allowed to go, otherwise they might be 
shot.242 The third factor is the complete control of Gaza’s airspace and territorial waters. 
Lastly, Dugard mentions the control over the Palestinian Population Registry, which 
includes the power to decide who is “Palestinian” and who is a resident of Gaza or the 
West Bank and who is not. This, consequently decides over, who has the right to enter 
Gaza, because only the holders of Palestinian identity cards are allowed to enter through 
Rafah, the border crossing between Egypt and the Gaza Strip.243 
Yet, since 19 September 2007 Israel has referred to Gaza as hostile territory, a concept 
that was approved by Condoleezza Rice, the United States Secretary of State.244 While 
the legal implications of this “status” are not defined, it served as an argument to 
legitimize the reduction of the supply of gas and electricity to Gaza by Israel.245  
The decision over Gaza’s status is so contested because the state of occupation implies 
Israel’s obligation to abide by international humanitarian law.  
It has to be determined to which human rights provisions Palestine refugees are entitled. 
In this thesis, among other sources, the Advisory Opinion by the International Court of 
Justice of the year 2004 will be used in order to demonstrate some of the arguments that 
were brought forward by Israel and the decision by the Court, which represents the 
international institution with the most legitimacy. An advisory opinion is a non-binding 
legal decision, but on 20 July 2004, an overwhelming majority of UN member states 
voted for General Assembly Resolution ES-10/15, which called on Israel to comply with 
the ICJ opinion.246 
Generally human rights grant rights to individuals towards their own country of 
nationality or residence (territorial application) and not against the enemy state like it is 
the case with humanitarian law.247 Nevertheless there are provisions within the different 
human rights instruments that expand the scope of application to include persons, who are 
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under the competence or jurisdiction of the authorities of another country, like it is the 
case in a state of occupation.248  
There is a possibility to override certain human rights provisions in the case of necessity, 
like for example public danger, as specified by article 4 of the International Covenant of 
Civil and Political Rights. Nonetheless there are certain provisions that always apply, 
including within an occupied territory, where at the same time humanitarian law 
applies.249 We talk about the “noyau dur” of human rights, including the right to life, the 
prohibition of inhumane and degrading treatment and other fundamental human rights 
provisions. In this case no derogation is possible.250  
In the present case “Israel denies that the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, both of 
which it has signed, are applicable to the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT). It asserts 
that humanitarian law is the protection granted in a conflict situation such as the one in 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, whereas human rights treaties were intended for the 
protection of citizens from their own Government in times of peace."251  
In its advisory opinion “Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory” (2004) the International Court of Justice (ICJ) responds 
to this assertion by stating that concerning the applicability of human rights law versus 
humanitarian law it is not a question of either or, but that there is the possibility that 
certain rights can be drawn from either one of these areas of international law. Therefore 
the argument of the Israeli authorities stating that humanitarian law applies does not 
exclude the applicability of human rights law provisions. In addition even if humanitarian 
law is applied during times of war, does not lead to the conclusion that human rights law 
is only applicable during times of peace. On the contrary, human rights law is applicable 
at all times.252 
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The Court reminds that Israel has ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and is therefore party to these instruments.253  
Concerning the area of application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights the Court has to interpret article 2, paragraph 1 of this instrument, which reads:  
“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to 
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.”  
Attention is on the wording “within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction”. The Court 
has to decide whether the “and” between the two conditions means that both have to be 
fulfilled or that one of them is enough. After taking into account object and purpose of the 
covenant, constant practice of the Committee of Human Rights and the travaux 
préparatoires of the text, “the Court considers that the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights is applicable in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its 
jurisdiction outside its own territory.”254 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights does not contain a 
provision concerning its scope of application, but the Court doesn’t  exclude “that it 
applies both to territories over which a State party has sovereignty and to those over 
which that State exercises territorial jurisdiction. “255 
The Court repeats the Israeli position according to which exclusively the Israeli 
settlements enjoy the rights enshrined in the Covenant whereas the Palestinian population 
finds itself excluded of this protection. This position is expressed in reports by Israel to 
the Committee of Economic, Social and Cultural Right from the year 1998, and 
statements by the Committee concerning this position.256 The Committee had expressed 
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its concern in this regard and also the ICJ “cannot accept Israel’s view.”257 The Court also 
reminds “that the territories occupied by Israel have for over 37 years been subject to its 
territorial jurisdiction as the occupying Power”. It concludes that Israel is bound by the 
provisions of the Covenant and that furthermore it is obliged not to hinder the exercise of 
those rights where competence has been transferred to the Palestinian Authority.258 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child contains an article (Art.2) stating that “States 
Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the (…) Convention to each child 
within their jurisdiction (…)". The ICJ therefore decides that this Convention is 
applicable within the Occupied Palestinian Territory.259 
We may conclude that certain human rights provisions, like the ones in the Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and others apply also to the OPT, notwithstanding of the fact 
that it is an occupied territory and that humanitarian law applies as well. Israel therefore 
has to abide by these provisions, and can be held responsible in case of a breach of 
international human rights law.  
 
5.2.3. The Right of Return 
In general international law all individuals have a right to return. According to Gail this is 
an inherent human right and exists independently of any government’s policy to allow for 
it or not.260 This right is anchored in the law of nationality, humanitarian law, human 
rights law and refugee law. If there was a situation of forced expulsion, which as we have 
seen is disputed regarding the present case, there is a heightened obligation to implement 
this right of return.261 
In 1948 following the first mass expulsion of Palestine refugees, the United Nations 
passed resolution 194 (III), the most important resolution concerning the right of return of 
Palestinian refugees to their homeland. It is important because it is widely known and 
often referred to when the issue comes up. Nonetheless it does not constitute a new right, 
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but merely confirms already existing and binding rights in international law.262 It has to 
be mentioned that resolution 194 does not refer to refugees who were displaced after 
1948, the 1967 refugees or any refugees displaced after that date.263 
In paragraph 11 of 194 (III) the General Assembly states that: 
“(...) the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their 
neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that 
compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and 
for loss of damage to property which, under principles of international law or in 
equity should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible.”264 
Of the three major possible solutions to a refugee problem (return, host country 
integration, resettlement) only return is a right under international law.265 Also Akram 
states that the right of return existed before the passing of resolution 194 (III):  
“Resolution 194 (III) acknowledges that no new rights were created in 
proclaiming the Palestinian refugees’ right of return to their homes and lands. 
Although the status of Palestinian nationals/citizens after the creation of the State 
of Israel has been much debated, established principles of state succession, human 
rights, and humanitarian law confirm that the denationalization of Palestinians was 
illegal and that they retain the right to return to their places of origin.”266 
According to Takkenberg, this paragraph “soon became the touchstone of the Palestinian 
refugees’ cries for justice”.267  
Ruth Lapidoth is among the scholars who do not believe in the existence of a right of 
return. In the following citation she is referring to the interpretation that resolution 194 
contains an explicit right of return. 
“This interpretation, however, does not seem warranted: the paragraph does not 
recognize any "right", but recommends that the refugees "should" be "permitted" 
to return. Moreover, that permission is subject to two conditions - that the refugee 
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wishes to return, and that he wishes to live at peace with his neighbours. The 
violence that erupted in September 2000 forecloses any hope for a peaceful co-
existence between Israelis and masses of returning refugees. The return should 
take place only "at the earliest practicable date". The use of the term "should" with 
regard to the permission to return underlines that this is only a recommendation. 
(…) neither under the international conventions, nor under the major UN 
resolutions, nor under the relevant agreements between the parties, do the 
Palestinian refugees have a right to return to Israel. According to Palestinian 
sources, there are about 3.5 million Palestinian refugees nowadays registered with 
UNRWA. If Israel were to allow all of them to return to her territory, this would 
be an act of suicide on her part, and no state can be expected to destroy itself.”268 
We can see that there are scholars who interpret resolution 194 in completely opposite 
ways. Many scholars explicitly acknowledge the right of return as a right accorded to the 
Palestine refugees, others deny this right. In this respect it should be acknowledged that 
authors who state that there is no such right usually also fear the destruction of the State 
of Israel in the case of the granting of this right and the consequent supposed mass influx 
of Palestinians into Israel. The most important actor in this respect remains the 
Government of Israel, who does not acknowledge this right. This is mainly due to 
different interpretations of the past and the national existence of the Palestinians as a 
people. The official Israeli historiography denies the existence of a Palestinian people.269 
According to a statement by Golda Meir in 1969 the Palestinians did not exist, Rabin 
referred to them as the “so called Palestinians” and Menachem Begin called them the 
“Arabs of Eretz Israel”.270 Since 1948 Israel has maintained its position that the return of 
Palestinian refugees, infringe on Israel’s right to self-determination. In addition there has 
been no “attribution of imputability of an internationally wrongful act”, which is the 
premise for reparation.271 Even though in the last two decades a group of new historians 
or revisionist historian have tried to set straight the history of events around the creation 
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of Israel, according to Farah “their impact (remains) marginal when compared to the 
dominance of Israeli historiography in the public arena and in Western societies.”272  
 
5.2.4. The Applicability of Humanitarian Law 
Older terms for international humanitarian law (IHL) would be law of war or law of 
armed conflict. This makes clear that this part of international law contains provisions 
that apply during a situation of war or armed conflict, and is meant to limit and regulate 
the use of force and violence by the enemy state. The aim of an armed conflict is to 
destroy another power,273 but civilians should be spared as well as combatants who are 
dehors combat, such as wounded or prisoners. One of the most fundamental principles of 
IHL is the distinction between ius ad bello and ius in bello. IHL deals exclusively with 
issues of ius in bello, which refers to rights and obligations during an armed conflict. 
They always apply to the same extent to all affected parties and the question whether 
(this) war is legal in international law, or the question about who is responsible for the 
war and who started it under what conditions (ius ad bello) is never of any importance to 
international humanitarian law.274 First attempts to regulate the use of force during armed 
conflict, date back to 1859, when Henry Dunant became witness to the battle of Solferino, 
and later founded the Red Cross. The first Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field was adopted in 1864.275 In this paper 
the Geneva Conventions (1949) – especially the third and fourth Convention, relating to 
prisoners of war and civilians – as well as the First Additional Protocol will be of 
particular importance.276 Many of the rules set out in previous instruments have then been 
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reaffirmed in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and there is consensus among jurists and 
governments that the older conventions have become part of customary international 
law.277 Virtually all UN member states are party to the Geneva Convention, including all 
countries that are dealt with in this paper. Concerning the Additional Protocols, Israel as 
well as Lebanon is not bound by them, whereas Jordan is bound by both Protocols and 
Syria by Protocol I.278 In 1989, the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations 
Office in Geneva informed the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, the 
depository of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two Additional Protocols, that 
Palestine would adhere to the Geneva Conventions. The Swiss authorities responded by 
stating that they couldn’t decide about the validity of this statement, “due to the 
uncertainty within the international community as to the existence or non-existence of a 
State of Palestine.”279  
There is no mention of refugees in the definition of protected persons in article 4 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention. However, they are covered and benefit from the protection 
provided for in that Convention due to their nature as civilian persons or combatants. 
According to article 4 protected persons are who, “at a given moment and in any manner 
whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a party to 
the conflict or occupying power of which they are not nationals”.280  
The fact that the occupation of the Palestinian territories has continued for more than 40 
years brings new considerations to the legal situation of an occupied territory, since these 
provisions have been adopted on the assumption that occupation was a temporary 
condition. 
“At present, there is a distinct risk that the law on occupations, if not adapted to 
special problems arising in a prolonged occupation, could be used or abused in 
such a way as to contribute to leaving a society politically and economically 
undeveloped. During a long occupation, many practical problems may arise that 
do not admit to mere temporary solutions based on the idea of preserving the 
status quo ante: decisions may have to be taken about such matters as road 
construction, higher education, water use, electricity generation, and integration 
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into changing international markets. Such decisions, although they involve radical 
and lasting change, cannot be postponed indefinitely.”281 
Surely there was a reason why also the ICJ repeatedly mentioned the long duration of the 
occupation in its advisory opinion on the legality of the wall.282 It did so especially in 
regards to the applicability of social and cultural rights to the Palestinians in the OPT.  
International humanitarian law has been of particular importance to Palestine refugees, 
since they have repeatedly been confronted with situations of armed conflict. This 
concerns especially citizens of Gaza and the West Bank, areas that have come under 
Israeli military control in 1967. Due to the fact that the status of these territories then 
changed into being occupied territories the status of the refugees changed as well.283 In 
addition to being refugees they became protected persons under the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions. International protection has been provided by the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC). The same applies to refugees subject to other armed conflicts, 
such as in Lebanon or in Kuwait.284  
In this context it should be mentioned that since the first Arab-Israeli war formally the 
state of war continues between Israel and Lebanon, as well as between Israel and Syria up 
to this day. Egypt and Jordan entered into peace treaties in 1979 and 1994 respectively.285  
In the OPT: 
In order to decide the applicability of international humanitarian law, the status of the 
OPT has to be determined. The International Court of Justice has elaborated on this issue 
in its advisory opinion of 2004. As already mentioned, article 42 of the Hague 
Declaration reads: “Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the 
authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such 
authority has been established and can be exercised.” 
There is consensus about the fact that the 1907 Hague Regulations are applicable to the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory.286 Israel does not accept the de jure applicability of the 
                                                 
281
 Takkenberg, 1998, p.205f.  
282
 ICJ, 2004, par.112.  
283
 Takkenberg, 1998, p.196.  
284
 Ibid.  
285
 Shlaim, 2000, p.273 and 539.  
286
 Israel has stated that it does honor and implement the regulations annexed to the fourth Hague 
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague Regulations). Al-Haq: The Israeli 
 68 
 
Fourth Geneva Convention,287 nonetheless it has indicated that it will respect the 
“humanitarian provisions” of the Convention on a de facto basis. These were never 
defined by Israel.288 Israel argues that the Convention does not apply because what is now 
the OPT was not a sovereign power in itself before it fell under occupation, and neither 
Jordan nor Egypt was the legitimate sovereign power in the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip respectively before the 1967 war. According to Takkenberg  
“(...) the rationale for taking this position was the fear that express 
acknowledgement of the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention might be 
interpreted as amounting to a formal recognition by the Israeli government that the 
territory occupied was the sovereign territory of the party which the occupying 
power had displaced, in other words, that Egypt had sovereignty in the Gaza Strip 
and Jordan in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.”289  
Israel’s position has found many critics. Up front the ICRC in its function as guardian of 
the Geneva Conventions has repeatedly criticized the occupant. There have been 
countless resolutions by the General Assembly and the Security Council, explicitly urging 
the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention,290 legal writers have voiced 
disapproval of this practice as well. The author agrees with this judgement and will from 
now on assume that international humanitarian law applies in the OPT.291  
Especially during the first intifada, allegations arose about gross violations of 
international humanitarian law by the occupying force Israel.292   
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5.2.5. The Legal Status of Palestinians in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan 
As we have seen above Palestine refugees, who get assistance from UNRWA are 
excluded from the 1951 refugee convention. This exclusion however only makes a 
theoretical difference for Palestinian refugees residing in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan 
because neither of these countries has signed the Convention or the Protocol.293 After the 
creation of the State of Israel and the exodus of Palestinians from the lands who are now 
Israel, the Arab states were “forced to grand de facto asylum to the refugees whether they 
liked it or not.”294 The reaction to this new reality by Jordan, Syria and Lebanon were 
very different. Jordan granted citizenship to the vast majority of Palestinian refugees who 
resided in the country. Today Palestinians make up the majority of Jordanians. In Syria 
Palestinians never constituted more than 2.5% of the population and the issue was and is 
therefore less politically sensitive. 295 This is in stark contrast to Lebanon, a country that 
always has to try to maintain the balance between its religions – the main reason for the 
exclusion of Palestine refugees from many parts of society and the denial of the granting 
of some fundamental rights. According to Takkenberg the Arab League only had limited 
influence on the treatment of Palestine refugees within its member states. Even though 
they tried to introduce certain minimum standards for the treatment of Palestinian 
refugees, “in practice the position of these refugees was, and continues to be, largely 
determined by political and security considerations of the governments of the Arab host 
countries.”296 In many cases there is no codified legal status of this refugee group, but the 
treatment is largely made up of administrative practice, and is subject to constant 
change.297 The Casablanca protocol although it contains only five articles is “the clearest 
manifestation of the intent of Arab states to provide for the treatment of Palestinian 
refugees.”298 Article one contains “national treatment” concerning the right to engage in 
economic activities. Articles two and three state that the individual should be allowed to 
leave the territory of the state of residence as well as the right to return to it, and that there 
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should be free movement in all states of the Arab League.299 Article four contains the 
obligation of the states to provide Palestinians with travel documents, and article five 
calls for a treatment equal to other Arab League nationals in respect of visas and 
residency.300 The Casablanca Protocol was adopted by a majority decision and is 
therefore only binding upon those member states willing to accept it. Furthermore 
reservations are possible. In 1969 a study was conducted by the Conference of 
Supervisors of Palestinian Affairs. This study concluded that policies and procedures in 
respect to the Casablanca protocol were far below standard.301 The PLO’s position during 
the 1991 Gulf War, when he supported Saddam Hussein created anger among the 
majority of Arab states and further weakened the legal regime concerning Palestinian 
refugees in Arab host countries.302 After the war a resolution was adopted by the League 
Council - “apparently in retaliation for the PLO’s support of Saddam Hussein” – that 
severely weakened the Casablanca Protocol.303  
In Lebanon 
From the start of the refugee problem Palestinians in Lebanon constituted a threat to the 
delicate balance between Christians and Muslims and indirectly to political and social 
stability. Therefore the Lebanese authorities decided to prevent the refugees from being 
absorbed. They constitute about 10% of the total population. “Their situation has been 
more difficult than in any other Arab host country.”304 In addition the Palestinian refugees 
have repeatedly been strongly affected by conflicts and wars within Lebanon and with 
Israel.305 Palestinian refugees are in principle subject to the same legal status as other 
foreigners. Only the refugees who fled during and in the aftermath of the 1948 war who 
took refugee directly in Lebanon without residing in a third country before are considered 
Palestine refugees. Palestinians who came later are considered illegal residents of 
Lebanon. UNRWA is not allowed to provide services for this group except in emergency 
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situations.306 The majority of Palestinians in Lebanon remain stateless. One exception has 
been made for Palestinian Christians when Camille Chamoun was president between 
1952 and 1958. They were granted citizenship in order to keep the balance between 
Christians and Muslims. There is also a considerable number of Palestinian Muslims who 
obtained citizenship. Some suggest that approval depended on connections and the ability 
to pay very high lawyer fees.307 Today estimations about the number of Palestinians who 
possess Lebanese citizenship range between 50,000 and 30,000.308 Refugees enjoy the 
same status as other non-Lebanese concerning employment, property rights, taxes etc. 
They need presidential consent in order to obtain immovable property, they are barred 
from a list of professions, especially with high-earning wages, such as medicine, law and 
engineering, and they have no right to social security.309 There were three different types 
of travel documents: one for UNRWA registered refugees, one for refugees registered 
with the League of the Red Cross Society, and one for Palestinians who are registered 
with neither of these organizations. The first category got a document that was valid for 
one year and renewable three times. The second type of document was also valid for one 
year and renewable three times, but could be distinguished by a rubber stamp indicating 
“valid for return”. Refugees who were not registered could obtain a travel document valid 
for three months that indicated “not valid for return”.310 In 1995 Palestinian refugees who 
had Lebanese residence but were at the time in Libya were literally left hanging by the 
government of Lebanon which decided that this group would not be able to return to 
Lebanon without a special re-entry visa.311 
In Syria 
The case of Palestine refugees in Syria is much less sensitive and politically charged than 
in Lebanon or Jordan. Palestinians only constitute a small minority of the total population 
– they never exceeded 2 to 3 percent.312 In addition at the time of the Palestinian exodus 
Syria was neither suffering from unemployment or from limited natural resources. On the 
contrary the country was under-populated and many economists welcomed the new 
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arrivals as a stimulus for economic development.313 In 1949 the then Prime Minister 
Husni al-Za’im even offered to resettle 300,000 Palestinians in the Jazirah region to farm 
the land along the Euphrates River. This proposal was never put into practice because 
Za’im was overthrown in a military coup. From 1949 on the Syrian government began to 
adopt a series of laws that practically put the Palestinians in the same legal situation as 
Syrian nationals.314 The Most important law for Palestinians in Syria is Law no.260 of the 
year 1956. It reads as follows: 
“Palestinians residing in Syria as of the state of the publication of this law are to 
be considered as originally Syrian in all things covered by the law and legally 
valid regulations connected with the right to employment, commerce, and national 
service, while preserving their original nationality.”315  
Other areas are not covered by the law, such as education, travel and property ownership. 
Palestinians in Syria basically enjoy the same quality of education as Syrian nationals. 
While most refugees receive their elementary education from UNRWA schools, almost 
all of them attend Syrian government schools for their secondary education.316 Syrian 
universities have also been open to Palestinians and some scholarships have been granted 
by the government for Palestinians to study abroad.317 Syria is the only Arab state where 
Palestinians are drafted into the national army.318  
It can be concluded that in law and in practice Palestinian refugees have enjoyed rights 
equal to the ones guaranteed to Syrian nationals. There are some exceptions, however, 
like the right to vote, the right to buy land and the right to own more than one house.319 
The government has established the Palestine Arab Refugee Institution (PARI) which was 
succeeded by the General Authority for Palestine Arab Refugees (GAPAR). GAPAR is 
primary responsible for camp administration and keeps an eye on all issues relating to 
Palestinian refugees in Syria. They have their own budget and assistance programme and 
cooperate with UNRWA in a number of programmes.320  
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In Jordan 
In 1950 the New Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was established. This included the 
annexation of the West Bank, which resulted in approximately half of the Kingdom’s 
population being Palestinian. Article three of the 1053 Nationality Law contains a 
provision explicitly referring to Palestinians:  
 “The following shall be considered Jordanian nationals: (…) 
 (2) Any person with previous Palestinian nationality except the Jews 
before the date of May 15th, 1948, residing in the Kingdom during the period from 
December 20, 1949 and February 16th, 1954;” 
Consequently, all Palestinians, irrespective of whether they lived in the East or the West 
Bank had become Jordanian citizens with the same rights and obligation as every 
Jordanian national. Palestinians are highly successful in Jordan. They are represented in 
the highest paying professions in the private sector as well as in government. There have 
been Palestinian generals, cabinet officers, and even prime minister.321  
Palestinians from the Gaza Strip were not considered for Jordanian nationality, as well as 
the Palestinians who took up residence in Jordan or the West Bank after the dates 
indicated in the 1954 law (1949-1954). This group of Palestinians in Jordan is inferior to 
the group of “Jordanian Palestinians”, and officially they are not allowed to work.322 Only 
in 1988, reacting to the intifada, King Hussein announced that the West and the East 
Bank would be legally separated and also Jordan administration would not extend 
towards the West Bank. The King was giving up his claims to sovereignty over the West 
Bank, leaving it to the Palestinians who where working towards their own sovereign 
state.323 This decision led to an implicit denationalization of Palestinians who were 
residing in the West Bank. There are scholars who challenge the power of the King’s 
speech to change the nationalities of the West Bank residence since no formal change in 
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the constitution followed. In addition West Bank Palestinians still hold their Jordanian 
passports.324  
A general problem that affects many Palestinian refugees in the Middle East is the one of 
residency status.325 As already mentioned the first country of refuge provided the refugees 
with a residence status. This status however was impossible to be transferred to a 
different country, other than the country of first refuge. Many Palestinians who migrated 
had no possibility to gain permanent residence status in their new host country. This fact 
can become a very pressing matter when individuals have lost their right of residence in 
the first country. They virtually have no country where they enjoy a right to stay. This 
was the case with the Palestinians expelled from Libya as well as the Palestinians forced 
out of Kuwait after Arafat’s support for Saddam Hussein. These individuals stay and 
work in a certain country but have no security whatsoever about the duration of their stay. 
They are completely dependant on the good-will of the host government and could be 
expelled at any time.  
 
5.2.6. Law Relating to Stateless Persons 
In this section the author will introduce the basic principles of law relating to stateless 
persons in order to add to the list of rights and obligations that might apply to the 
Palestinians who have become refugees. The majority of Palestinians are stateless 
persons.326 A person can be born stateless or become stateless during the course of his or 
her life. In addition there are de jure and de facto stateless persons, where de facto 
stateless persons lack an effective nationality. A state can decide who it wants to make a 
national, but in addition there has to be a legal bond and a genuine connection with the 
State.327 Still statelessness is an anomaly328 and article 15 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights reads “Everyone has the right to a nationality”. This is of fundamental 
importance because only a nationality gives a person the right to demand rights from the 
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respective state of which he or she is a national. The problem with article 15 is that the 
Declaration doesn’t indicate who is to grant nationality in the case of statelessness. 
Statelessness is undesirable for individuals, but also for states because it can lead to 
frictions. Therefore since the mid-20th century there have been international efforts to 
reduce this phenomenon.329 In 1961 the United Nations adopted the Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness. Prior to the British mandate, the inhabitants of Palestine were 
Turkish nationals330 as Palestine was part of the Ottoman Empire. During the British 
mandate, mandate citizenship was regulated by the Palestine Citizenship Order, and 
Palestinian citizens could obtain a British passport but which referred to the holder as 
“Palestinian citizen”.331 Yet, Palestinian citizenship was “a product of the mandatory’s 
authority, (and) terminated with the mandate and with the proclamation of the state of 
Israel on 15 May 1948”.332 Since there is no Palestinian state until today, Palestinians 
who have not acquired the nationality of a third state remain stateless.333 
In summary of the status of Palestinian refugees in international law one can conclude 
that there is no international body responsible for aspects of Palestinian refugee protection 
within UNRWA’s area of operations and, after the UNCCP became effectively defunct, 
for the search for a permanent solution. This results in the de jure protection gap of 
Palestinian refugees living within UNRWA’s area of operations. A de facto protection 
gap for Palestinian refugees living outside UNRWA’s area of operations exists and 
results, according to Takkenberg, from the fact that UNHCR does not always optimally 
exercise its responsibility in respect of the protection of this group of Palestinian 
refugees.334  
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5.3. UNRWA’s Protection Mandate 
 
There is no document which would lay down or clearly define UNRWA’s mandate but it 
is composed of a number of General Assembly resolutions. Therefore, it has been subject 
of interpretations, especially by UNRWA itself, and has changed over time. 
Consequences and problems resulting from this fact have been discussed in chapter 3.3. 
above.  
When UNRWA was created in 1949 by GA Resolution 302 (IV) its mandate was 
expressed in article 7: The General Assembly,  
 “Establishes the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees 
in the Near East: 
(a) To carry out in collaboration with local governments the direct relief and works 
programmes as recommended by the Economic Survey Mission; 
(b) To consult with the interested Near Eastern Governments concerning measures to 
be taken by them preparatory to the time when international assistance for relief 
and works projects is no longer available.”335 
Although UNRWA was mandated to consult with the governments, the mission has been 
focused on relief and on works programmes. 
Yet, as already mentioned, in 1950 its mandate had already been subject to change by the 
General Assembly. In resolution 393 of 2 December 1950 the Assembly states that “the 
reintegration of the refugees in the economic life of the Near East, either by repatriation 
or resettlement, is essential (…)”.336 In this respect the Agency was mandated to establish 
a reintegration fund.337 The involvement of the agency in settlement issues was a very 
different task from providing humanitarian services and put the agency in contact with the 
strong political currents in the region.338 Repatriation and resettlement clearly are two 
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aspects in the search for a durable solution. Therefore, this meant the involvement of 
UNRWA in protection issues, for the first time.339  
Today UNRWA describes itself as “a global advocate for the protection and care of 
Palestine refugees”.340 Still, this role has not yet been adequately defined. UNRWA’s 
Quarterly Report on Organisational Development, covering the period from January until 
March 2008 shows clearly that the Agency is still trying to define its actions and 
competencies in this regard. 
“A review of UNRWA’s protection role has been undertaken. This will pave the 
way for a revised protection strategy and the engagement of a new Senior 
Protection Advisor working with updated terms of reference.”341 
The next chapter will treat the origin of a protection mandate for Palestine refugees in 
general, UNRWA’s predecessors and its creation. 
 
5.3.1. Historical Origin 
The UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) was established by General 
Assembly Resolution 194 (III) in December 1948. The Commission is composed of 
representatives of the United States, France and Turkey. It was mandated to provide 
protection to Palestine refugees and to facilitate durable solutions for persons displaced as 
a result of the 1947-1948 conflict and war in Palestine.342  
The second part of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) reads as follows: 
“(The General Assembly) Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the 
repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees 
and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the 
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Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, 
with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations.”343 
Through the creation of this Commission the protection mandate for Palestinian refugees 
had first been created, and among the given possibilities of long-lasting solutions 
repatriation has been given an emphasis.344  
In 1950, The General Assembly by passing resolution 394 (V) requested the UNCCP to 
protect the rights, properties and interests of the refugees. The UNCCP dealt with the 
territorial question as well as with the status of Jerusalem, and made strong efforts 
towards the implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194(III) (“the right of return”). 
A number of proposals concerning the return of a number of refugees has been made at a 
conference in Lausanne in 1949, but the UNCCP could not reconcile the positions of the 
parties.345 In July of the same year the Israeli cabinet announced that it would be willing 
to accept the offer made by the UNCCP to take back 100,000 refugees in the context of a 
peace settlement. This offer was never put into practice because the Arab delegations later 
rejected it as inadequate.346 When it became clear that there wouldn’t be a rapid solution 
of the refugee problem through repatriation, efforts started to resettle the refugees in Arab 
countries. The Economic Survey Mission (ESM) was founded in order to examine the 
economic situation in the countries affected and to make recommendations to the UNCCP 
for an integrated programme.347 An ESM interim report was delivered in November 1949. 
It described the dilemma of the refugees: the majority would like to return home, but they 
can’t. Resettlement in other countries was not a realistic option because many refugees 
refused to be moved again. In addition resettlement in third countries was seen as 
undermining the refugees’ rights given by resolution 194 (III) to return to their lands. 
Therefore the report concluded that “the only immediate constructive step in sight is to 
give the refugees an opportunity to work where they are now”.348 The report also 
recommended creating an agency to direct “a programme of public works, calculated to 
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improve the productivity of the area.”349 The agency should also take over the relief 
efforts directed towards the Palestine refugees. In resolution 302 (IV) of 1949 the General 
Assembly created UNRWA, acting on the recommendations of the report. The events that 
led to the creation of UNRWA are important for this thesis because they demonstrate 
clearly the intentions that lay behind the creation of this agency, and characterize 
UNRWA once again as a humanitarian agency, which was established in addition to the 
UNCCP, which was charged with the responsibility for protecting the Palestinian 
refugees. After the creation of UNRWA, the UNCCP continued its efforts to implement 
paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) but, once it had realized that repatriation turned out to 
be an ever more distant possibility, it focused on the issue of compensation.350 In this 
context it is worth mentioning that the Refugee Office which was established by the 
UNCCP estimated the value of the property abandoned by the Palestinian refugees at 120 
million Palestine pounds, which were approximately 1.85 billion US dollars in 1990. This 
sum should constitute a dept by the Government of Israel to the refugees. This estimation 
was never accepted by Palestinian or Arab economists believing that it was much too 
low.351 The Commission was also responsible for the return of a small number of refugee 
dependents through a family reunification programme.352 
In 1951 the UNCCP tried one more time to address the issue of repatriation in a 
conference in Paris – but unsuccessfully. Whilst Israel stated that “major considerations 
of security and of political and economic stability made the return of Arab refugees 
impossible”, the Arab delegations claimed that “no limitations on the return of the 
refugees” could be made.353 The UNCCP succeeded in reaching an agreement with the 
Government of Israel about the release of Palestinian bank accounts that had been 
blocked in Israeli banks, and established an Office for Identification and Valuation of 
Arab Property, which completed its work in 1964. Since that date, according to 
Takkenberg, UNCCP made no more substantial contribution to the protection of Palestine 
refugees.354 According to Badil, a Palestine-based NGO, the UNCCP has not provided 
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Palestinian refugees with basic international protection since 1952, when it declared 
failure of its repatriation efforts after the Paris Conference355. Nonetheless it was never 
formally abolished and continues to issue annual reports to the General Assembly, re-
citing that progress towards the implementation of resolution 194 (III) depends on 
substantial changes by the parties.356 In 1985 the report stated that “as far as the 
Commission is concerned, the circumstances which unfortunately have limited its 
possibilities of action have remained up to now essentially unchanged.”357 During the last 
couple of years the Commission just stated that “it has nothing new to report.”358 
We can summarize the reasons for the failure of the UNCCP in three categories: Firstly, 
Israel’s noncompliance with resolution 194 (III) and its rejection of the right to return. 
Secondly, Palestinians were unwilling to abandon their right to return, and Arab host 
countries rejected UN proposals to integrate the refugees into their host countries. And 
thirdly, there was a lack of commitment by the international community towards 
supporting UNCCP’s efforts.359 
As we have seen the principal organ by the United Nations charged with protecting 
Palestine refugees is the UNCCP, which although it has ceased operations, has not been 
formally abolished, therefore leaving the protection issue in a grey area, where one has to 
differentiate between theoretical and actual protection.  
 
5.3.2. The RAO-Programme 
The 1967 war and the occupation of the Palestinian territory had strong implication for 
UNRWA’s work as well. Benjamin Schiff explains this with the following words: 
“When in 1967 Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the distinction 
between the agency’s humanitarian assistance role and political involvement 
became more problematic. It was impossible to be apolitical in a totally politicized 
environment. Although UNRWA had had difficulties with others of the host 
governments, the Israeli relationship was the first one in which the refugees 
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themselves were considered enemies by the sovereign power with which UNRWA 
had to deal.”360 
This development has to be taken into account when discussing the agency’s protection 
efforts in the OPT.  
In the rise of the Palestinian uprising, or intifada, in 1987 the Security Council adopted 
resolution 605, deploring Israeli violations of human rights of the Palestinian people in 
the OPT, and called on Israel to abide by the rules laid out in the Fourth Geneva 
Convention.361 Consequently the Secretary-General issued a report which included ways 
of how the situation of the Palestinians could be improved. He stated that a just  and 
lasting settlement of the conflict was the best way to ensure their rights, but that in the 
meantime Israel should be urged to accept the de jure applicability of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention to the occupied territories. He deplored the different concepts of protection 
(as mentioned above) and saw a special role of UNRWA in the protection of Palestine 
refugees in the OPT.362  
For the purpose of providing a measure of protection to the Palestinian refugee population 
several international staff members were transferred from headquarters in Vienna to the 
Gaza Strip and the West Bank, the so-called Refugee Affairs Officers, or RAOs.363  
According to UNRWA’s annual report 1990, the RAOs “facilitated Agency operations 
and assisted the refugee population in their day-to-day life.”364 
Furthermore, “(t)he refugee affairs officers also helped, by their presence, to lower 
tensions and to prevent maltreatment of the refugees, especially vulnerable groups 
such as women and children. They helped to evacuate the wounded, to reduce 
interference with ambulances and to obtain the release of refugee children. They 
assisted the population as occasion arose, for example, to obtain permits for 
funerals. They also helped to obtain curfew permits to carry on essential services 
during curfew periods and to facilitate the movement of essential food and 
medical supplies to camps and other locations where needed. In performing these 
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functions the refugee affairs officers sometimes succeeded in establishing a 
dialogue with Civil Administration officials and were able to assist on the spot in 
numerous matters affecting the welfare of the population.”365 
Referring to this example, we can summarize the function of the Refugee Affairs Officers 
in the following categories: a) indirect protection, i.e. the anticipation of human rights 
violations by mere presence; b) physical protection (evacuation of the wounded); c) 
advocacy (the release of refugee children, help to obtain permits etc.); and d) assistance.  
In the 1991 annual report there was further description of the RAOs’ duties: 
“They (the RAOs) and the Agency's legal officers, together with locally recruited 
assistants, continued efforts to uphold the legal rights of the refugees and to 
safeguard the Agency's privileges and immunities, including the treatment of 
Agency staff.”366 
Unfortunately it was not explained what was meant by efforts to uphold the legal rights of 
the refugees. Later in the same paragraph the introduction of a legal aid scheme was 
mentioned.367  
 
5.3.3. The OSO-Programme 
In 2001 a new programme called the Operation Support Officer Programme (OSO) was 
initiated by UNRWA.368 The aim of the programme is to facilitate the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance to the refugee population, safeguarding the neutrality and 
integrity of UNRWA’s programmes and installations, to monitor the human rights and 
humanitarian situation of the refugees.369 It is providing a measure of protection, 
primarily indirect protection through its presence but also monitoring and reporting.370 
It does so also by ensuring “the integrity of the Agency’s installations”.371 What is meant 
is that the OSO Programme also serves as an internal monitoring system trying to prevent 
                                                 
365
 Ibid.  
366
 UNRWA, Annual Report, 1989/1990, par.89.  
367
 Ibid. 
368
 UNRWA Emergency Appeal 2008, p.24.  
369
 Ibid.  
370
 UNRWA, Annual Report 2006, p.10, par. 51. 
371
 UNRWA in 2006, p.28.  
 83 
 
the misuse of UNRWA facilities for political reasons. The programme tries to restore the 
trust in UNRWA as an impartial organization, which was repeatedly accused of 
collaborating with alleged terrorists, employing them, offering room for the recruiting of 
potential suicide bombers or militants in their schools, and being unable to prevent the 
misuse of their ambulances. 
“(The programme) also functions as the Agency’s principal focal point on protection 
issues in the field.”372 It addresses disruptions of freedom of movement and officers have 
conducted a number of research projects in the OPT, providing valuable information for 
UNRWA and other agencies.373 In addition, the simple presence of these officers, who are 
visible as international presence, can have a very positive effect on the situation on the 
ground. This is an example of indirect protection, a concept which will be more closely 
deplored in the next sub-section. In addition to these indirect effects the OSO-officers 
also intervene with Israeli military and police agencies.374 According to Farah, the 
protection function of the programme is of informal nature due to the lack of an explicit 
protection mandate granted to UNRWA. This supposedly protects UNRWA against 
accusations that it has violated its role as a humanitarian actor.375 Consideration of recent 
reports by UNRWA makes clear that, although they do use the term protection, at least 
publicly the Agency is unwilling to claim a major role in this field. This will be illustrated 
by the following example: the report UNRWA in 2006 states that “Operations Support 
Officers monitor and report on the humanitarian situation (...)” (emphasis added). In the 
whole section on the OSO programme, there is no mentioning of human rights and 
consequently no mentioning of human rights violations.376  
Again according to Farah, “such temporary programs (the RAOs and OSOs) provide a 
practical example of how international protection could actually become more effective in 
the Palestinian context.”377  
Referring to the RAO and the OSO programme, Bob Bowker states that “(in) both cases, 
UNRWA provided, at the time, the most effective option available to the international 
community to give concrete expression to its concerns - to ensure the safety and 
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protection of Palestinians under occupation on one hand, and to make the results of the 
peace process felt by the Palestinian refugee community on the other.”378 
 
5.3.4. Efforts towards Durable Solutions 
UNRWA does not have a mandate or significant experience concerning the 
implementation of durable solutions. Nonetheless there are a number of incidents were 
UNRWA contributed to this matter on a case-to-case basis. These efforts include the 
repatriation of Palestinian refugees, who remained on the Egyptian side of the border after 
the return of the Sinai to Egypt according to the Camp David accords in 1982.379 Also the 
agency’s resettlement activities during the 1950s fall under the category of durable 
solutions. UNRWA established a Placement Services Office, which provided assistance, 
such as emigration loans, to Palestinian refugees, who agreed to be resettled in Libya or 
Iraq. At the time there was a full-time liaison officer for each country.380 For a short 
period of time UNRWA also assisted overseas emigration for refugees who has already 
obtained visas, but this “experiment”, as it is called by Rempel, was suspended after one 
year at the request of local governments.381  
In 2008, an independent consultant was charged with the task of defining what protection 
means for UNRWA and with making recommendations on how UNRWA could 
implement the concept into its work.382 In this report it is stated that while UNRWA itself 
cannot bring about a durable solution to the problem it still has the political duty to 
promote efforts to this effect. According to Nicholas Morris, the author, “UNRWA 
should engage with those drawing up negotiating papers and proposing positions and 
policies in order to ensure to the extent possible that these take proper account of the 
rights and interests of the refugees and of UNRWA’s experience and knowledge.”383 
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5.3.5. Advocacy 
Despite the fact that UNRWA shows itself from a rather neutral side in its official reports, 
shying away from many key words that might be aim of criticism, international staff does 
speak up publicly in defence of basic human rights and humanitarian law. After analysing 
a number of recent speeches by and interviews of UNRWA international staff, as well as 
a number of annual reports by the agency, the author wants to summarize their attitude as 
follows: They usually argument from a human rights perspective, using UN documents 
and resolutions to support their arguments. There is criticism of the Israeli closure regime, 
settlements, mentioning of the wall,384 and the wide range of Palestinian rights are 
repeatedly mentioned. In past annual reports the authors have tried to maintain a fact-like 
language, listing human rights abuses without including language that would imply 
recommendations to the actors, such as “should”, ”has to” etc. Most of the time there is 
an emphasis on the humanitarian impact of the methods that were under scrutiny – such 
as the closure regime in Gaza and the West Bank. 
Of course, advocacy is not just reporting and speaking in the interest of Palestine 
refugees, but can consist of more practical measures, such as legal aid, or direct 
involvement with the authorities in charge in order to obtain a change in their behaviour. 
While there are many practical examples for this, especially in the context of the RAO or 
the OSO-programme, based on the information contained in UNRWA’s annual reports, 
these efforts have mainly be focused on UNRWA personnel. This was frequently the case 
when staff was detained without charge or killed.385 In addition, OSO officers will also 
intervene with Israeli military personnel, when they feel UNRWA’s privileges and 
immunities are not being respected. Staff is assisted in crossing checkpoints and obtaining 
the necessary permits.386 The majority of staff consists of Palestine refugees, so the 
advocacy efforts reach the refugee population. Still in these cases UNRWA’s engagement 
is based on a different reasoning which is not related to the broader question of protection 
of Palestine refugees, but is set forth clearly in a number of provisions concerning UN 
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personnel and their rights and immunities.387 Therefore, this engagement is not subject of 
this paper.  
Examples, where advocacy efforts were directed to Palestine refugees that are not 
UNRWA staff, include the introduction of a legal aid scheme,388 and “efforts to secure 
refugees’ access to employment, secondary education and other fundamental rights 
(…)”389 in Lebanon. According to Takkenberg, while efforts for the protection of 
UNRWA staff is still stronger, UNRWA is “increasingly also raising issues referring to 
the refugee population at large.”390  
“Intervention can range from a letter to the local military commander to (...) issues 
where we seek a meeting, to reporting on trends if we notice a pattern of violation. 
We report on that in different reporting formats to donors, to the General 
Assembly and to sometimes human rights bodies. In exceptional cases we may 
take the situation to the press, and elevate it to that level, but never without first 
seeking the consultation on the matter with the Israeli authorities.”391 
Richard Cook, Director of UNRWA affairs in Lebanon, gives another example of 
advocacy efforts: 
“(We) know of 24 young people from Nahr al-Bared who are still in prison and 
we are following up with ICRC over this. We also ask the army to grant us and 
residents better access to the camp.”392 
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5.3.6. Co-operation between UNRWA and UNHCR 
Co-operation between the two is limited. In 1983 following the occupation of Lebanon, 
the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU)393 issued a report on UNRWA including a section dealing 
with Protection of refugees. In this section the Co-operation with UNHCR was mentioned 
after very clear words and recommendations about the protection gap:  
“UNRWA’s mandate does not extend to the protection of refugees. (…) The 
Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (…) is specifically excluded from 
a role in the protection of Palestinian refugees. JIU is convinced that this 
anomalous situation should not and need not continue. (…) JIU feels that the 
involvement of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees could have a 
positive effect on the safety and security of Palestinian refugees. It therefore 
suggests that the Secretary-General (…) should consult with the High 
Commissioner for Refugees to determine what possibilities exist for co-operation 
between HCR and UNRWA (…).”394  
These recommendations were never implemented. Takkenberg concludes that fears 
within UNHCR of a politicization of the agency were the reason for this.395 
There were incidents where both UNHCR and UNRWA cared for the same group of 
refugees, as was the case in the years following 1995 when Libya decided to expel the 
Palestinians residing in Libya. Some of the Palestinians had literally nowhere to go and 
were stranded in the border area between Libya and Egypt. Both agencies engaged in the 
search for a satisfactory solution.396 
In 2006, “UNRWA also began to provide, in collaboration with the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, limited assistance to over 600 Palestine refugees who had 
fled the conflict in Iraq to the El-Hol refugee camp in the north of the Syrian Arab 
Republic or to the "no-man's land" between the Syrian and Iraqi borders.”397 
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5.3.7. Critical Thoughts on the Actual Effects of an Explicit Protection 
Mandate 
The protection gap for Palestinian refugees in the international refugee regime is evident 
but does that necessarily mean they have disadvantages towards other refugees? Or, put in 
a different way, “would UNHCR be able to provide for better protection?” In the past 
practice regarding Palestinians outside of UNRWA’s operations varied considerably. On 
the one hand, Palestinians were denied refugee status when governments referred to the 
exclusion paragraph 1D of the Refugee Convention. In this context UNHCR mandate for 
Palestine refugees could be helpful. On the other hand, as we have seen above, this 
exclusion is not a real exclusion but entails also an ipso facto inclusion, that is, 
Palestinians should, as a group, be considered refugees under the convention if they no 
longer receive assistance from UNRWA. Consequently one could argue that it would be 
enough if governments were aware of this fact. Furthermore the ipso facto inclusion could 
actually facilitate access to international protection for Palestine refugees – a condition 
that might have to be abandoned if Palestine refugees were set under the UNHCR regime. 
UNHCR is well respected and as organisation that is charged to monitor the fulfilment of 
the 1951 Refugee Convention it is officially recognized and the status of this 
internationally binding instrument of international law gives it further leverage. 
Nonetheless, the status of refugees in general is not at all satisfactory.  
UNRWA on the other hand lacks this explicit mandate but, nonetheless, many of its 
efforts are directly and indirectly directed towards the goal of protecting the refugees that 
are under its mandate. As already mentioned the physical presence of UNRWA especially 
in the OPT can often diminish the tensions between the Palestinian population and the 
IDF, or prevent physical attacks or humiliation towards Palestine refugees.  
The discussion of actual effects of a protection mandate is important in order to take the 
discussion from the theoretical level to a more practical one. What that means is that an 
explicit protection mandate does not automatically lead to an improvement of the 
situation of the group of refugees concerned – examples for this can easily be found when 
researching refugees that enjoy UNHCR protection.398 
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UNHCR enjoys high credibility among United Nations member states, and can give a 
refugee issue high importance on the international level. This power to give leverage to a 
certain problem cannot be compared to UNRWA’s possibilities to intervene in the public 
discourse. Of course this is also due to the fact that UNRWA enjoys almost no 
international visibility. What results from this is the question, if UNRWA – in the case it 
would be granted a protection mandate for Palestine refugees – would be able to establish 
itself as a credible and impartial actor. 
 
5.3.8. Criticism in the New Millennium  
Following the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000 and partly caused by UNRWA’s 
efforts to enhance protection of Palestine refugees, the agency has been subject to 
criticism by the Israeli authorities. The then Commissioner-General, Peter Hansen, had 
condemned Israel’s military incursions on the West Bank and Gaza, which influenced 
UNRWA’s humanitarian activities in the OPT.399 The IDF had rejected to allow 
ambulances and relief workers into the camps. There were accusations against UNRWA 
that it had used its ambulances to transport rockets into the occupied territories.400 
UNRWA schools were used as military posts, and Israeli armed attacks of UNRWA 
vehicles, clinics, schools, and personal had led to the death and injury of a number of 
UNRWA employees. In response to Hansen’s criticism Alan Baker, the Israeli foreign 
ministry’s legal adviser met with U.S. lawmakers and State Department officials in 
Washington in 2002 “to put pressure on the U.S., and to reiterate Israeli concerns about 
what he called ‘anti-Israeli’ bias by some UN officials”.401 These officials include Kofi 
Annan’s Special Middle East envoy Terje Roed-Larsen and Peter Hansen.  
Since 2005 the Israel-UNRWA relationship has improved in a substantial matter, which 
among other factors can be contributed to the new Commissioner-General Karen Koning 
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AbuZayd, which made it a priority to improve the way in which UNRWA was perceived 
by Israel and western donors.402 
 
5.3.9. The Evolution of the Term Protection within UNRWA 
During the first three decades of UNRWA’s work the term protection has hardly been 
used in the sense of legal protection.403 In 1967’s annual report it was mentioned that this 
report didn’t discuss issues of protection relating to the occupation of the Gaza Strip and 
the West Bank, because the Secretary-General had appointed Nils-Goran Gussing as his 
representative to get the information needed in this respect.404 In this case the use of the 
word comes close to today’s understanding of it, but it is limited to the gathering of 
information about legal rights violations. The term did not find its way back into 
UNRWA’s annual reports until 1983 in reaction to the war in Lebanon. It basically 
referred to efforts by the Commissioner-General who intervened with the Lebanese and 
Israeli government trying to convince them to increase their own protection measures for 
Palestine refugees.405 In this context Commissioner-General Olof Rydbeck made the 
following general comment about protection and UNRWA’s role therein: 
“The responsibility for the protection of the civilian population lies with the 
territorial sovereign or, in the case of occupied territory, the occupying Power. I 
have nevertheless considered it to be a clear moral duty for the Agency to assist in 
ensuring the safety of the Palestine refugee's in Lebanon. The only means at the 
disposal of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA and the UNRWA Field 
Director in Lebanon is, however, to report, to warn and to make representations to 
the authorities responsible. This we have done frequently.”406  
In the following years the term was used in the same context that is, referring to 
monitoring and the reporting of violations of human rights.  
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In the context of its RAO-programme in the OPT UNRWA used the wording measure of 
protection.407 This term has been frequently used and continues to be used today 
especially when referring the OSO-programme.408  
The RAO and the OSO-programme have already been discussed; hence, at this point it 
shall only be reminded of the fact that those programmes did indeed enlarge the concept 
of protection in covering more than mere monitoring and reporting functions. 
In August 2006 UNRWA published its Organizational Development Plan 2006-2009, 
which is called “Serving Palestine Refugees more effectively” and is the core document 
for the agency’s management reform, commonly also referred to as “Organizational 
Development” or “OD”.409 The restructuring of the organization is due to be finalized by 
the end of 2009.410 
In this report, whereas the implementation and strengthening of protection mechanisms is 
not explicitly mentioned, it is made clear that UNRWA sees protection as one of its core 
functions. UNRWA’s vision for the future of Palestine refugees comprises three points, 
one of which reads:  
“Our vision is for every Palestine refugee to enjoy the best possible standards of 
human development, including (...) feeling assured that his or her rights are being 
defended, protected and preserved”.411  
The report stresses that the vision is a general one and doesn’t necessarily imply that this 
is exclusively UNRWA’s responsibility. Nonetheless one out of six desired outcomes 
reads “Human rights enjoyed to the fullest extent possible”.412 The agency is working on 
further definition of the outcomes. Indicators have been developed but are still being 
improved. They should be finalized by the end of 2009 and set for adoption in 2010-
2011.413 
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Four dimensions of activities through which results are delivered are being defined in 
UNRWA’s Interim Programme Strategy 2008-2009. In the context of this paper the third 
point is of importance:414 “Incorporating thematic areas, such as inclusion, protection, 
gender equality, and support for vulnerable groups (…), into everything we do”.415  
Today protection is seen by the Agency as a cross-cutting issue within its work. It is not 
labelled one of its programmes but it shall be included in all of its work. As of now, this 
is an ongoing process and the exact outcome of this including a clear description of what 
UNRWA considers its protection work and how it wants to integrate it into all of its 
programmes has not been delivered, yet.416 
 
5.3.10. International Reactions to UNRWA’s Protection Efforts 
In 1983’s annual report, when UNRWA was faced with the consequences of the war in 
Lebanon, the Advisory Commission was in favour of efforts to improve protection: 
“The Commission shares profoundly your concern for the vulnerability of 
Palestine refugee civilians and the need to assure their physical and legal 
protection. It is appreciative of your efforts to "report, to warn and to make 
representations to the authorities responsible".”417  
In 2004, for the first time, UNRWA organized a high-level conference in Geneva in order 
to get more international visibility, explain its work into more depth to its donors and “to 
produce recommendations on the strengthening of UNRWA’s capacity to provide 
essential assistance and, where applicable, protection for Palestine refugees.”418  
According to Commissioner-General Hansen, one of the goals of the conference was “to 
break free of the short-term outlook that has, of necessity, hobbled the Agency’s planning 
(…).”419 There was a clear message that UNRWA should improve planning and 
analytical abilities, and its service delivery. An integrated approach towards more 
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efficiency was called for. In other words, the participants stressed that UNRWA had to 
plan further ahead in spite of its temporary mandate. Protection as a cross-cutting issue is 
part of this integrated approach. In the chairman’s summary, it was stated:  
“In a more general context protection was raised as a central theme in many 
discussions, although UNRWA does not have a specific protection mandate. 
Participants stressed that detailed data and research about the present protection 
needs, in particular of vulnerable groups, including children, is required. Relevant 
and disaggregated data covering violence, abuse and exploitation should therefore 
be compiled and analyzed.”420 
The participants of this conference were mostly member states of the UN, many of them 
already donors of UNRWA. Therefore this is an example were interested governments 
expressed their opinion that UNRWA should further engage in its protection role. An 
additional argument for the support of UNRWA’s engagement in protection is the 
absence of protest by the General Assembly. 
 
5.3.11. Recent Developments: The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 
In a personal talk with Lex Takkenberg – who is the author of the book “The status of 
Palestinian refugees in international law” and who has worked for UNRWA for almost 20 
years – the present author learned that UNRWA has changed its attitude in respect to the 
issue of protection. After years of discussions among and about UNRWA concerning its 
protection mandate – or rather the lack thereof – UNRWA has come to adopt a different 
point of view. Riding the wave of a more global development towards a responsibility to 
protect (R2P), Takkenberg states that “we now essentially take it as a given that UNRWA 
has a protection mandate”.421 In addition to the already mentioned UN resolutions, which 
contain elements of a protection mandate, this is now an additional reasoning in order to 
come to the conclusion that UNRWA has a mandate to protect the refugees concerned. 
The present author welcomes this move as a smart step, because it avoids polarisation of 
the issue of protection and stresses that in the end protection is about the respect of basic 
human rights. By doing so it does justice to one of the fundamental principles of the 
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United Nations: the promotion of human rights. Consequently, in respect to UNRWA’s 
work, this has led to the conclusion that “essentially assistance and protection are two 
sides of the same coin. And irrespective whether it’s explicitly incorporated in the 
mandate documents of the organization in question (...) it’s always like an implied power, 
an implied responsibility.”422 As already mentioned, UNRWA is still in the process of 
internalising this conclusion – discussing how it could be incorporated into day-to-day 
operations.  
In order to understand this new reasoning it is necessary to know more about the origins 
and the development of the concept of the responsibility to protect. In the United Nations 
2005 World Summit more than 170 countries came together to try to draw up measures 
that would enhance the ability of the international community to protect populations from 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. They agreed in the 
fact that the international community, “acting through the United Nations, bears a 
responsibility to help protect populations from genocide and other atrocities when their 
own governments fail to do so” (emphasis added).423 This new understanding stems from 
negative experiences of genocide, such as in Rwanda, where the UN was unable to 
prevent the crimes. In order to do this the concept of humanitarian intervention had to be 
introduced – legitimizing the right to intervene in situations of grave human rights 
violations and bypassing the concept of state sovereignty. This responsibility to protect 
“is not only the responsibility of states but also on United Nations organisations.”424 
 
5.4. Identification of Protection Gaps 
 
As discussed above protection gaps exist for Palestine refugees within UNRWA’s area of 
operation as well as for Palestine refugees outside of this area. In the following chapter 
there will be concrete examples for human rights violations that affect Palestine refugees 
within UNRWA’s area of operation, since this paper focuses on the need for protection in 
relation to UNRWA’s potential to address this issue. Most of these violations happen in 
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the public eye but nonetheless, due to the lack of a powerful advocate for Palestinian 
rights, they persist.  
 
5.4.1. Violations of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in the OPT 
As already discussed above, since the 1967 war the OPT is regarded an occupied territory 
and therefore subject to both human rights provisions and international humanitarian law. 
 In many instances it is not possible to distinguish between human rights violations 
towards refugees or non-refugees within the OPT. But since Palestine refugees constitute 
over 40 percent of the total population of the OPT it is clear that they are hit by these as 
well as the rest of the population.425 
After the outbreak of the first intifada in 1987, UNRWA’s annual report listed some of 
the measures taken by the occupying power in order to defeat the uprising without calling 
them human rights violations. 
“Administrative detention of large numbers of refugees suspected of involvement 
in the demonstrations, the demolition or sealing of houses occupied by families of 
Palestinians accused of security violations, the imposition of curfews and other 
restrictions on travel, the expulsion of individuals considered to have played a role 
in directing the resistance to the Israeli occupation, fines, taxation, confiscation of 
identity cards (without which residents of the territories cannot work or even move 
freely), closure of schools, cutting off water, electricity and telephone service to 
communities, and other economic and political measures have all added to the 
difficulties confronting the residents of the territories.”426  
“UNRWA has noted physical ill treatment of refugees and the destruction of their 
property, the sealing and demolition of houses, instances of intimidation, 
deportations and the application of collective punishment.”427 
The OPT is not a sovereign state, therefore rights and obligations of actors on the 
Palestinian side differ from the ones inherent to a sovereign state.428 Nonetheless the 
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Palestinian side is also responsible for human rights violations, some of which will be 
discussed hereafter, among violations by Israeli authorities.  
• The West Bank Barrier 
In 2003 the General Assembly called on Israel to cease construction of the Barrier. When 
Israel did not comply, the General Assembly called on the ICJ to issue an advisory 
opinion on the legality of the Barrier. In this opinion the construction of a wall inside the 
OPT has been declared illegal.429 The ICJ ruled that it had jurisdiction to decide over the 
legality of the issue, it stated that the construction on the territory east of the Green Line 
could not be justified by military necessity or by the requirements of security of public 
order.430 Nonetheless construction continues.431 When complete, approximately 10.2 per 
cent of the West Bank territory, including East Jerusalem, will be located to the west of 
the barrier and isolated from the rest.432 The construction is having a major humanitarian 
impact on Palestinian communities in the West Bank. Citizens, who live in the so-called 
seam zone between the barrier and the 1967 Green Line, face considerable difficulties 
reaching work, schools, universities or relatives. An OCHA study, carried out in 2007 and 
researching the effects of the barrier on 57 Palestinian communities came to the 
conclusion that 94 individuals, mostly women and children had not obtained re-entry visa 
and therefore had not left their own community since the construction of the wall, due to 
fears that they wouldn’t be able to go back home.433 An OCHA-UNRWA survey found 
out that none of the communities enclosed enjoy 24 hour access to medical services. This 
poses difficulties in emergencies, such as women in labour. A report by the Ministry of 
Health to the World Health Assembly in 2008 claimed that 69 women were forced to give 
birth at Israeli checkpoints, five of the women died as a result.434 In many instances 
families have been separated from their farming land, but only 40 percent of those 
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affected have been issued with permits. The majority has no access to their land.435 Often 
religious holidays, weddings and funerals cannot be attended by the extended family. The 
permit regime has also led to a change in wedding patterns. Women traditionally move to 
their husband’s locality, and often parents have been unwilling to approve of a wedding 
that would leave their daughters in isolation. 
• Settlements 
Immediately after the 1967 war Israeli settlement activity in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory started.436 Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention refers to the issue of 
settlements and the transfer of population.  
“The Occupying Power shall not (...) transfer parts of its own civilian population into 
the territory it occupies.”437 
It is important to point out that the creation of settlements in itself is not automatically 
prohibited or illegal, whereas the active policy by the occupier to transfer population into 
the occupied territory does fall under this provision.438 The Israeli government defined 
areas of interest within the territory (East Jerusalem and the Jordan Valley). This 
happened within the framework of an official government plan, the so-called Allon 
Plan.439 It should also be mentioned that settlement activity never came to a complete 
halt, especially not in the time following the Oslo agreements, in which a two-state 
solution was being aimed at.440 
Eighty-five percent of the West Bank Barrier is within the territory of the West Bank. The 
ten percent that are now to the west of the 1967 Green Line include almost all major 
Israeli settlements. Israel continues to expand its settlement activity; the settlement 
population has been growing by around 5.5 percent each year.441 83 percent of the West 
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Bank consists of settlements, military bases and other Israeli-controlled areas. Settler 
violence against Palestinians “continues with virtual impunity.”442 
UNRWA’s annual report 2007 states that, “Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank 
continues; tenders for the construction of 847 new housing units have been issued by the 
Israeli authorities since the Annapolis meeting in November 2007.”443 
• Demolition of Houses 
The demolition of houses had been an Israeli policy ever since the beginning of the 
occupation in 1967.444 According to Amnesty International in 2004 it had reached an 
unprecedented level. It was estimated that between the beginning of 2001 and May 2004 
more than 3,000 homes, hundreds of public buildings and private commercial property as 
well as vast areas of agricultural lands had been destroyed by Israeli authorities in Israel 
and the OPT.445 Reasons for the demolitions as stated by Israeli authorities are military 
necessity, punishment or the lack of a building permit.446  
As the occupying force Israel is not allowed to destroy property of the occupied. Article 
53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention reads: 
“Any destruction by the occupying power of real or personal property belonging 
individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public 
authorities, or to social or co-operative organizations, is prohibited, except where 
such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.” 
Furthermore, in most cases the demolition of houses also constitutes an action of 
collective punishment, which is explicitly banned by international law.447 Destruction is 
often aimed at houses of suicide bombers and others known or suspected of involvement 
in attacks. Israeli army’s spokespersons often include the following sentence in their 
announcement of house demolitions, stating that “the demolitions of houses of terrorists 
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sends a message to suicide bombers and their accomplices that anyone who participates in 
terrorist activity will pay a price for their actions.”448 The Israeli argument is that the 
demolition is not supposed to punish the family but, as the citation made clear, to deter 
potential attackers, who may decide against getting involved in the attack knowing that 
they might cause the homelessness of their family.449 Notwithstanding of this 
argumentation, the remaining families are the victims of the destructions. In addition, 
according to Amnesty International, in many cases surrounding buildings are affected as 
well, a fact that supports the notion of collective punishment.450 
The issue of permits is also not as obvious as it might seem, because although many 
buildings are indeed built without a permit, Palestinians are frequently forced to do so, 
because once again the permit system is very restrictive and sometimes it is virtually 
impossible to get one.451  
Whilst there are provisions in international humanitarian law that allow the destruction of 
property in cases in which “such destruction (is) imperatively demanded by the 
necessities of war (...)”452, destruction always has to remain within the limits of 
proportionality.453 Israel argues that its actions are in accordance with this principle and 
ensure that their operations do not disproportionately harm civilians. Many Human Rights 
organisations as well as international organizations dispute this interpretation. 
• Jerusalem 
The status of Jerusalem remains one of the most contested issues in the whole conflict. 
East Jerusalem is regarded by the international community as occupied territory since the 
1967 war. Jerusalem is also affected by the construction of the West Bank Barrier, which 
tries to separate East Jerusalem from the West Bank. In connection with a very restrictive 
permit system, this fact can only be described as highly political. The goal of which 
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would be the Judaization of East Jerusalem by reducing the number of Palestinian 
residents in the city.454  
• Freedom of movement  
All crossings from and to the Gaza Strip are controlled by Israel.455 According to the 
Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) Palestinians are allowed to travel freely 
from Gaza to the West Bank and Egypt. In addition the number of export trucks through 
Karni should be substantially increased.456  Following the capture of Gilat Shalit on 25 
June 2006 and especially since June 2007, when events in Gaza resulted in the seizure of 
power by Hamas, there have been serious implications on the freedom of movement of 
Palestinians as well as access. Rafah, the crossing from Gaza to Egypt, is monitored by 
delegates from the European Union, which was also decided in the AMA of 2005. For 
alleged security reasons, the Israeli authorities have continuously denied the international 
monitoring officials to enter Gaza, resulting in the fact that it remained closed for lengthy 
periods since 2006.457 From June to August 2007 about 6,000 Palestinians were stranded 
on the Egyptian side of the crossing, denied the right to return home. Over 30 people died 
while waiting.458 Erez crossing is effectively closed, which is the crossing Palestinians 
need to pass in order to enter Israel or to transit to the West Bank. Karni is the most 
important crossing for goods, scheduled to operate six days per week has been closed on 
12 June 2007. Since that date the crossing operates very limited on a two day average.459 
This fact was repeatedly criticized by UNRWA Commissioner-General, Karen AbuZayd, 
as well as John Ging, Director for Operations in Gaza,460 because it highly affected 
UNRWA’s work and results in a lack of basic humanitarian goods but also of 
construction material which meant that UNRWA construction projects with a value of 
USD 84 million came to a halt in 2007.461  
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In recent years there has been an ongoing increase in checkpoints and other obstacles 
throughout the West Bank. In September 2008 OCHA counted 630 obstacles in the West 
Bank and East Jerusalem blocking Palestinian movement.462 This development is contrary 
to the Agreement on Movement and Access of the year 2005, which demanded a 
reduction of these obstacles. 
• Prisoners 
The IOF detains a number of Palestinians without charge or trial for very long periods. 
This is called administrative detention. This order permits for the detention of periods 
between 3 to 6 months. These periods however can be indefinitely renewed without 
reference to charge or trial.463 By the end of 2007 at least 750 Palestinians were in 
administrative detention. According to article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, this 
treatment is only allowed as an exceptional measure for “imperative reasons of security”. 
The Palestinian Center for Human Rights argues, that detention without charges is rather 
a measure of punishment, and not necessitated by reasons of security.464  
In 2007 five Palestinians died in Israeli prisons, four of which suffered from chronic 
diseases. In its annual report 2007 the Palestinian Center for Human Rights raises 
concerns about the medical treatment of detained Palestinians.465 The fact that the 
majority of deaths was among ill people supports the notion that there is reason for 
concern. 
• Military incursions 
There have been over two thousand military incursions in 2005 into the OPT. After the 
capturing of an Israeli soldier in 2006, 203 Palestinians were killed and almost 1,000 
injured within two months.466 In November 2006, during a six-day-siege on Beit Hanoun 
in northern Gaza, 50 Palestinians were killed and many refugee homes were destroyed.467 
By late November 2006 when a ceasefire was announced over 450 Palestinians had been 
killed through Israeli military actions in Gaza alone.468 The Human Rights Council has 
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again condemned the ongoing incursions in a resolution passed during a special session 
on human rights violations emanating from Israeli military incursions in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory.469  
• Violence against women and girls 
Data on violence against women and girls within the OPT is not very comprehensive but 
a report by Human Rights Watch indicates that there are high levels of violence within 
the family. This violence is enhanced during times of political violence.470 According to 
this report the Palestinian Authority fails in addressing these issues appropriately, which 
leads to “virtual impunity for perpetrators of domestic violence.”471  
• Interfactional fighting  
Since the takeover of force in Gaza by Hamas in 2007, interfactional fighting and 
tensions between Hamas and Fatah have caused an additional source of major human 
rights violations. The violations – in both the West Bank and in Gaza – include arbitrary 
arrest, torture, unlawful detention and denial of access to a lawyer. All of these are 
contrary to Palestinian law. There also prohibited by a large number of international 
human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention against Torture. Not 
being a national state the PA cannot formally sign those treaties, but both, Hamas and 
Fatah, have stated that they adhere to those instruments.472 
 
5.4.2. Existing Mechanisms to Fight for Human Rights 
After having discussed the vast array of human rights violations concerning Palestinian 
refugees, the next paragraph will further illustrate the existing protection gap. The 
underlying question is “who can Palestinians turn to when they feel their rights are being 
violated?” And how are the chances that this will lead to an improvement of the situation? 
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Concerning the occupied territories this question is of particular interest, because 
competencies by the occupying power and the Palestinian authority are not clearly 
defined, and disagreement on the issue of responsibility exists in many instances, for 
example concerning the Geneva Conventions and Human Rights provisions, as we have 
seen in the above chapter. 
The Oslo Accords or Declaration of Principles of 1993 were considered a milestone in 
Israeli-Palestinian relations. They created the Palestinian Authority and wanted to 
establish an interim self-government of the Palestinian people.  The general idea included 
a transfer of power from the occupying force to the Palestinian people. The judicial 
branch was part of this set of rules. But still there are great problems within the OPT 
concerning the distribution of competencies. Being an occupied territory, jurisdictions of 
the occupying power and the one by the Palestinian Authority are often intermingled. 
Israeli perpetrators within the OPT are not brought before Palestinian courts. This poses 
huge difficulties concerning assault by settlers against the Palestinian population. These 
often violent assaults combined with the fact that they mostly go without punishment 
adds to the frustration of the Palestinian people in the OPT and is therefore an important 
issue in this conflict.473  
Shortly after the West Bank and Gaza became occupied in 1967, the Israeli military 
commander announced that he had assumed all powers and authorities.474 Since then, 
Israel has created a series of legal changes. The legal basis for the practices of the 
occupying power is formed by military orders. According to a report by Al-Haq from 
2004, these “orders introduced substantial and radical changes to the Palestinian judicial 
system which was well-established in the Palestinian territories before the occupation 
began. Further, they severely curtailed the jurisdiction of local courts, limiting their 
jurisdiction to addressing the internal affairs of the Palestinians.”475 The Israeli High 
Court’s jurisdiction was extended to also cover the OPT. Local residents filed petitions to 
the Israeli High Court questioning the legitimacy of military practices. Since 1967 the 
High Court has reviewed hundreds of such petitions. The issues addressed included the 
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confiscation of land, demolition of houses, deportation, administrative detention, 
collective punishment and assassinations. Most of these petitions were refused.476   
In 2005 the Knesset introduced new legislation that “effectively bars Palestinians from 
the OPT from suing Israel for death, injury or damages caused by Israeli security 
agents.”477 At that time, only around 10 percent of Palestinian civilian deaths were 
investigated at all and only a handful of IDF soldiers had been convicted for causing 
death or injury. “The IDF maintains the policy that killings of Palestinians will be 
investigated only under exceptional circumstances, which neither the IDF nor the 
government has ever defined.”478 
We can conclude that Israeli courts do not offer Palestinian victims the prospect to get a 
fair trial. This is due to the very particular way of the Israeli judiciary to interpret their 
own jurisdiction in the OPT as well as their interpretations of international law, which in 
many instances aligns itself with interpretations of the legal situation made by Israel’s 
political actors, and which in many instances is strongly criticised.479 
Concerning internal human rights violations, the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian 
judicial system should be the ones responsible for guaranteeing those rights. But in many 
cases the system is unable or unwilling to protect the victims. Women who have become 
victims to domestic violence many times are sent back to their homes, because their 
families’ reputation is prioritized over their basic human rights.480 The Palestinian police 
is very limited in its capacity to respond to individual criminal charges. They have almost 
no investigative capacity.481 The public prosecutor’s office has repeatedly been criticised 
for not investigating in cases of killings of Palestinians by other Palestinians on the 
suspicion of collaboration with Israel.482 In 1994, when the PA came into power the 
Palestinian judicial system was barely functioning in the OPT. The situation is further 
complicated by the fact that it has only has jurisdiction over criminal matters that 
happened in areas A and B, C is excluded. In addition, under the Oslo Accords 
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Palestinian courts have no jurisdiction on Israeli citizens, such as settlers, or Israeli 
security forces.483 There is an acute lack of qualified judges and lawyers.484  
 
The Human Rights Council 
In 2007 a group of dispossessed Palestinian people, represented by a team of lawyers, 
BADIL and the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE), filed a petition under 
the confidential “1503” complaints procedure to the Human Rights Council.485 This 
complaint procedure was first introduced by ECOSOC resolution 1503 of May 1970, 
therefore the name, and has been reviewed by ECOSOC in 2000 and by the Human 
Rights Council in its resolution 5/1 “UN Human Rights Council: Institution Building” of 
18 June 2007. According to the official website of the Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, the reviewed version of the procedure “(...) was improved where 
necessary to ensure that the complaint procedure be impartial, objective, efficient, 
victims-oriented and conducted in a timely manner.”486 It is of confidential nature in order 
to enhance cooperation of the State concerned. The objective of the procedure is “to 
address consistent patterns of gross and reliably attested violations of all human rights 
and all fundamental freedoms occurring in any part of the world and under any 
circumstances.”487 On 19 June 2008 the petitioners were informed that their appeal was 
no longer under consideration and that no reasons would be given for why the case was 
dropped.488 One possible explanation could be that human rights violations by Israel are 
discussed in the Human Rights Council on a frequent basis. This fact might justify the 
application of the following criteria under which the petition would not be accepted for 
examination under this procedure:  
“It refers to a case that appears to reveal a consistent pattern of gross and reliably 
attested violations of human rights already being dealt with by a special 
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procedure, a treaty body or other United Nations or similar regional complaints 
procedure in the field of human rights.”489 
Yet, the human rights council predominantly deals with human rights violations within 
the OPT, and the petition did refer to events within the territory that is now the State of 
Israel, therefore even this argumentation could be put into question. 
Nonetheless, even if there are reasons not to respond to the petition in this case, this 
example clearly shows the lack of accountability concerning human rights violations. The 
Human Rights Council deals with this issue, and is frequently criticized for the fact that it 
gives too high priority to violations by the State of Israel. Still, it can be argued that this 
UN body did not lead to substantial improvements concerning the human rights situation 
in the area concerned. Consequently, petitions are not accepted but violations persist.  
In addition, there is the possibility to file individual complaints under UN human rights 
treaty bodies, among others the Human Rights Committee, which monitors the 
implementation of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC). As already mentioned UNRWA cooperates and provides information regarding 
individual cases during the process of filing a complaint.  
 
5.5. Conclusion on UNRWA’s Role in Protection 
One of the biggest challenges for UNRWA remains the severe underfunding of the 
agency – also in respect of its engagement in protection. In 2006 the funding deficit was 
US$ 71.5 million, forcing UNRWA to scale down its services in health, education and 
assistance to the poor.490 Obviously, serious efforts to improve the agency’s protection 
function demand funding. Taking into account that the humanitarian situation remains 
dire, any serious change towards this goal will also depend on future donor support.  
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As we have seen different definitions of the term protection can be found. Nonetheless 
the common characteristic of the concept remains the question of responsibility. Who is 
to be responsible for Palestine refugees? And who could individuals turn to in case of 
violations of their rights? Following the invasion in Lebanon in 1982 the General 
Assembly adopted a resolution calling for “The Protection of Palestine refugees” and 
called upon the Secretary-General and UNRWA to “undertake effective measures to 
guarantee the safety and security and the legal and human rights of the Palestine refugees 
in the occupied territories.”491 The then Commissioner-General of UNRWA made an 
important statement in response: “(…) responsibility should go with power, and (…) 
under international law it is for the occupying power to ensure that the civil and other 
rights of the inhabitants of the territory are safeguarded.”492 This is one of the crucial 
points of the whole protection discussion. In practical terms the deciding factor for the 
effectiveness of protection depends on the political weight and actual power of the 
protecting power or organization. Refugees don’t enjoy protection of their own national 
state or they might be stateless persons so the international community should fill this 
gap. Nonetheless it is the national states of residence that are responsible for breaches of 
international law and they should be held accountable. The author concludes that 
UNRWA cannot alone be responsible for the well-being of Palestine refugees – this 
difficult task does not lie within its power. But it can strengthen and elaborate its role as 
an advocate for the cause of the refugees under its mandate through closer monitoring of 
violations of human rights and calling on the states concerned to take up the responsibility 
they have under international law as well as calling on the international community to 
increase their efforts to hold states responsible for their illegal actions. Even if 
International Organizations are mandated with the task of protection, there is always an 
imbalance of power, because their adversaries are sovereign States. Therefore real 
protection has to come through states as well. It is sovereign states who decide on 
Security Council resolutions, the taking of measures under Chapter VI and VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations, or if they want to follow-up on human rights violations 
through the ICJ or through individual criminal prosecution by establishing a tribunal 
comparable to the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia or Rwanda. 
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Still, UNRWA, due to its strong presence and decades-long experience in the region, is in 
a good position to work towards the introduction of more effective protection measures. 
There is still a wide margin and possibilities for engagement towards a better human 
rights situation, without compromising UNRWA’s role as an impartial actor. If it wasn’t 
for the always difficult financial situation, efforts could go towards more support to 
individuals by having a team of international lawyers or by directly negotiating with the 
authorities also when the individual concerned is not a member of UNRWA staff. 
There are differing voices concerning the future involvement of UNRWA concerning the 
matter of refugee protection. According to Rempel UNRWA should not play a major role 
in refugee protection, due to its “overall limited resources” and “limited experience in this 
area.”493 At the same time the NGO BADIL, who published Rempel’s paper, repeatedly 
also called for a stronger engagement in this field. According to Randa Farah, UNRWA 
should not be officially granted a protection mandate, because this could prove 
counterproductive, as UNRWA might risk its current flexibility, resulting from the fact 
that it is perceived as a mostly humanitarian organization that poses no threat to the host 
governments.494 Although Rempel does acknowledge the fact the UNRWA has some very 
important qualities like its extensive regional network and knowledge of the socio-
economic situation in its area of operation and information contained in UNRWA’s 
registration system, he states that “with little experience in this area, and lingering 
suspicions about attempts by the international community to use the Agency as a tool for 
de facto or forced resettlement during the early years of its operations this role would be 
better left to an international protection agency, with a strong record of protecting and 
facilitating refugee choice.”495 
These are just some examples of opinions but they show that the discussion on the official 
and explicit mandate is a difficult one. Taking this fact into account the author welcomes 
the recent developments within UNRWA which include a new understanding of the 
protection mandate: now the agency assumes that it has a protection mandate even though 
it is not as explicitly mentioned as is the case with UNHCR. But it takes its mandate from 
the global responsibility to protect – a concept that has evolved and was strengthened 
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during the last couple of years in connection with the broader UN reforms. The author 
sees this change within the agency as a smart move in order to move towards a more 
effective engagement towards protection, but steering clear of the troubled discussion of 
the explicit protection mandate, which might have politicised UNRWA’s work. It can 
only be hoped that this new approach will also lead to changes on the ground and visible 
improvements to the human rights situation of Palestine refugees.  
6. Conclusion 
Let us now go back to the initial question of this thesis. Why does UNRWA still exist 
today? There are a number of reasons for this fact. First of all, UNRWA could not be 
dismantled because the international community has proven to be unable to find a just and 
long-lasting solution to the Palestinian refugee problem.  
Despite reoccurring criticism towards the agency – by scholars, journalists and other 
individuals from all sides to the conflict and countries not directly concerned – there are 
obvious reasons for all concerned to keep UNRWA because it serves the relative well-
being of a population that is otherwise deprived of the most fundamental rights and 
consequently opportunities to provide for themselves. In this thesis the author tried to 
show that it is this contribution that lies in the interest of all of the actors concerned. 
Therefore, it has been a logical and welcomed step that, when new needs arise, UNRWA 
should step in and provide more or different services. That is the underlying concept of 
many of UNRWA’s adaptations in the past, such as the enlargement of health care 
services, education, micro-credit schemes, and large-scale development projects like the 
one planned for Nahr el-Bared. 
This has happened despite the fact that even UNRWA itself in the past has criticized its 
own engagement in the region, encouraging a stronger engagement of the Arab countries. 
Yet, the Arab states as well as all other countries concerned have not taken measures to 
provide the most basic services to the Palestine refugee population – leaving UNRWA as 
the only actor to take on this task. Being a UN organ it stands for the responsibility of the 
UN and the international community for the refugee problem.  
Taking into account the bigger picture of the issue UNRWA cannot be held responsible 
for perpetuating the refugee problem. At the same time it is not just a passive player 
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carrying out the functions laid down by the UN, but rather it disposes of a relatively large 
discretion to take its own decisions.  
According to Takkenberg “by and large (...) the Commissioner-General takes the 
ultimate decisions of the organisation”, and “what drives her is the ultimate best 
interest of the agency and the refugees we are serving. And that is pretty much 
respected by the principal stakeholders. (...) We’re able to steer the course that we 
think is in the best interest of the refugees. It’s not that we’re pulled into the 
direction of a specific donor interest, of a specific host country.”496 
Protection differs from all of the other changes and adaptations made in the past because 
it touches upon basic human rights of Palestine refugees – an issue that will necessarily 
lead to criticism towards most of the host countries where UNRWA operates. The agency 
finds itself in a dilemma: on the one hand as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations it is 
committed to the concept of universal human rights, and on the other hand the non-
political, humanitarian aspect of its existence has come to be the answer to most of the 
criticism brought against the agency and the guarantee for comparatively good relations 
with all host countries. Therefore, this principle is of fundamental importance to 
UNRWA.  
The official protection mandate, if it were to be conferred to UNRWA, which in the 
author’s eyes is not likely to happen in the near future, or at any time given the arguments 
mentioned above, could have the same effects as the resettlement efforts in the 1950’s, 
that is, a politicisation of the Agency, which could threaten its ability to deliver its 
services to the people in need, and consequently lead to the rejection of this mandate.  
Now, the existence of a dilemma results from the characterisation of protection and the 
humanitarian mandate as two extremes, where one is threatening the foundation of the 
other. Yet, the functioning of an organisation like UNRWA is, of course, much more 
subtle and diversified, trying to please different stakeholders by diplomatic efforts and 
compromises. In this respect, the way out of the dilemma could be by negating that there 
is a dilemma and, instead, taking the “way-in-between”. What is meant is the “silent” 
enhancement of protection efforts. As shown above, work has been done in order to 
improve the human rights situation of the refugees – through initiatives like the RAO and 
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the OSO-programme, reports, speeches by senior officials of the agency and through 
confidential negotiations with governments. UNRWA officials have not been afraid to 
speak up for the people under UNRWA’s mandate, even if it meant to criticise one of the 
agency’s host countries. These efforts happened without serious damage to the perception 
of UNRWA as an impartial player.  
The fact that direct improvement from an official protection mandate cannot be a certain 
assumption gives further backing to the new approach within UNRWA according to 
which the agency already has a protection mandate. This realisation stems from the global 
responsibility to protect, which applies also to all UN organisations. Human rights of 
Palestine refugees are an issue in a number of forums, such as a number of bodies of the 
United Nations, the Council of Europe, various national and international NGOs, and 
national governments. It can be doubted that UNRWA would be able to find a way out of 
the political dead-lock that has characterized the situation of Palestine refugees for the 
last six decades if it were to be granted an official protection mandate. Therefore the 
concentration on smaller scale improvements should be continued, desirably with 
increased funds, the lack of which is one of the reasons that impede the agency’s work to 
improve human rights for Palestine refugees.  
As we have seen the United Nations have been involved in this issue since its creation in 
1948, and are partly held responsible because it suggested partition of Mandate Palestine 
and because of its recognition of the State of Israel. But also the Arab states have their 
role to play. They are constantly divided between two concepts: the one of solidarity 
towards the Palestinians and the one of their own political and security issues, which in 
many cases leads them to neglect the humanitarian needs of this refugee group. In the 
light of the rather negative outlook on the conflict today, the author stresses the 
immediate protection needs of Palestinian refugees based on human rights and 
humanitarian law as opposed to the merging of the refugee problem with a just and long-
lasting political solution.  
UNRWA is in a unique role due to its decades-long involvement with Palestine refugees 
as well as through its role as an impartial and above all humanitarian actor. There is still a 
big potential within the organization to increase its efforts concerning protection. 
Nonetheless UNRWA always needs to be careful in order not to risk the fact that it is 
perceived as a rather apolitical actor. The organization depends on the cooperation and 
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good-will of the host governments in order to ensure the deliverance of its services to the 
refugees concerned.  
Responding to the question if there could be any negative effects caused by stronger 
engagement in protection of refugees Lex Takkenberg stated that “any change meets 
resistance” but that he wasn’t sure if there were any negative effects, despite the fact that 
“there is obviously a tremendous challenge in taking on protection issues and to raise it to 
Israel and host countries.”497 
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8.2. Abstract (English) 
 
Almost 60 years after the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was established by the General Assembly as a 
temporary agency, it remains active, and one might argue that it is more established in the 
region than ever. This thesis tries to explore the reasons for this fact by focusing on 
UNRWA’s role in development and the protection of refugees. In her research the author 
was guided by the questions “why did UNRWA’s mandate expand?”, “who initiated the 
changes?” and “whose interest does UNRWA serve?” 
The concept and the implementation of development have changed considerably – a 
change that can be documented and shown. The agency’s engagement in protection issues 
has changed as well and discussions within the agency on its protection role are still 
ongoing. For years authors have focused on the protection gap and on the fact that 
UNRWA does not have an explicit mandate – in contrast to UNHCR. But recent 
developments within the UN and within UNRWA have changed this focus 
fundamentally. Today UNRWA takes it as a given that it possesses a protection mandate. 
The author sees still potential within the organization to increase its efforts concerning 
protection. Nonetheless UNRWA always needs to be careful in order not to risk the fact 
that it is perceived as a rather apolitical actor. 
The thesis concludes that most changes to UNRWA’s mandate were initiated by the 
General Assembly or the Secretary-General of the UN or were in response to necessities 
on the ground. When UNRWA took on new responsibilities without a clear mandate, 
these were repeatedly given consent by the General Assembly retroactively. Taking into 
account the bigger picture of the issue UNRWA cannot be held responsible for its own 
existence or for perpetuating the refugee problem. At the same time it is not just a passive 
player carrying out the functions laid down by the UN, but rather it disposes of a 
relatively large discretion to take its own decisions.  
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8.3. Abstract (German) 
 
Die Diplomarbeit behandelt die Veränderungen, die innerhalb der UNRWA stattgefunden 
haben. Die grundsätzliche Frage hierbei ist, „wieso existiert die UNRWA eigentlich 
noch“? Sie wurde vor fast 60 Jahren als „temporäre“ Organisation von der 
Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen ins Leben gerufen, aber sie ist nach wie vor 
aktiv im Nahen Osten tätig. In ihrer täglichen Arbeit gibt es wenig Anzeichen dafür, dass 
es sich um eine temporäre Organisation handelt, sondern es macht den Anschein, als hätte 
sie sich dauerhaft eingerichtet. Im Ursprung hat sie sich hauptsächlich um Nothilfe für 
Palästina-Flüchtlinge gekümmert. Im Laufe der Jahre hat sie sich jedoch in einen 
Anbieter von quasi-staatlichen Leistungen gewandelt, mit einem umfangreichen Angebot 
an Grundschulen, Gesundheitseinrichtungen und sozialen Auffangmechanismen.  
In der Arbeit werden die wichtigsten Veränderungen des Aufgabenbereichs der 
Organisation im Laufe der Zeit dargestellt. Dabei wird immer gefragt „warum ist es zu 
diesen Veränderungen gekommen?“, „wer hat diese Veränderungen initiiert?“ und „wer 
hat ein Interesse daran, dass UNRWA ihre Arbeit weiterführt bzw. erweitert?“  
Die Autorin hat sich in der Suche nach Antworten auf diese Fragen auf zwei Themen 
konzentriert: Entwicklung und Menschenrechtsschutz der Flüchtlinge. Das Thema 
Entwicklung eignet sich besonders um die Veränderungen in der Organisation zu 
verdeutlichen, da in diesem Bereich offensichtliche Veränderungen stattgefunden haben, 
die gut dokumentiert und nachvollziehbar sind. Menschenrechtsschutz ist ein sehr 
aktuelles Thema, welches in der UNRWA selbst noch Diskussionen mit sich bringt und 
dessen Rolle noch nicht genau geklärt ist. Es ist ein kontroverses Thema, da bei dem 
Schutz von Menschenrechten immer die eigentlich Verantwortlichen auf ihre 
Versäumnisse aufmerksam gemacht werden müssen – in diesem Fall bedeutet das Kritik 
an den Gastländern, in denen UNRWA arbeitet und von dessen gutem Willen sie 
abhängig ist. 
Im Bereich Entwicklung hat UNRWA wichtige Errungenschaften zu verzeichnen, jedoch 
wäre es von Vorteil wenn sie besser in internationale Mechanismen eingebunden wäre, 
die es auch erlauben die Arbeit mit Bezug auf bestimmte Kriterien regelmäßig zu 
evaluieren.  
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Im Bereich Menschenrechtsschutz ist es vor allem seit der Besetzung der 
palästinensischen Gebiete im Jahr 1967 zu einem Umdenken innerhalb der Organisation 
gekommen. Obwohl UNRWA nicht über ein explizites Mandat für den Schutz von 
Menschenrechten verfügt – ganz im Gegenteil zu UNHCR – und sich jahrelang auf dieses 
Defizit konzentriert worden ist, geht die Organisation heute davon aus, dass sie im 
Rahmen einer globalen Verantwortung zum Schutze dieser Rechte über eben dieses 
Mandat verfügt.  
Die Arbeit kommt zu dem Schluss, dass die Mandatserweiterungen der UNRWA 
meistens von anderen Akteuren, wie dem Generalsekretär oder der Generalversammlung 
der Vereinten Nationen initiiert wurden oder durch Notwendigkeiten vor Ort begründet 
waren. Beim selbstständigen Übernehmen neuer Aufgaben hat im Nachhinein meistens 
eine Billigung dieser Veränderungen durch die Generalversammlung stattgefunden. 
Des Weiteren muss man sich bei Kritik an der Organisation bewusst sein, dass nur durch 
die Unfähigkeit der internationalen Gemeinschaft eine gerechte Lösung des 
Flüchtlingsproblems zu finden die Existenz der UNRWA überhaupt noch nötig ist. Sie 
kann als Unterorganisation der UNO auch nicht für ihre eigene Existenz verantwortlich 
gemacht werden. Trotzdem besitzt sie in der Ausrichtung ihrer Arbeit über beträchtlichen 
Spielraum und Autonomie.  
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